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ABSTRACT 
Neuro-imaging studies have strongly implicated the basolateral amygdala in dreaming (e.g. 
Maquet et al., 1996). Various neuropsychological dream theorists (Domhoff, 2001; Hobson, 
Pace-Schott & Stickgold, 2000; Revonsuo, 2000) propose central roles for the amygdala in 
dreaming (particularly in the generation of dream affect); however, little empirical research 
on its function in dreaming exists. Urbach-Wiethe Disease (UWD) is a very rare genetic 
condition that can lead to calcifications in the medial temporal lobes. This study analysed 26 
dream reports collected from eight adult UWD patients with fully calcified basolateral 
amygdalae bilaterally, and compared them to 58 dream reports collected from 17 matched 
controls. Dream affect and various other dream characteristics were examined.  
A number of significant results of small to moderate effect size were found. Notably, 
UWD patients’ dream reports had a significantly higher mean intensity of positive affect than 
controls’ dream reports, a significantly lower mean intensity of negative affect, a significantly 
higher mean intensity of PLAY, and a significantly lower mean intensity of RAGE. The 
UWD patients’ dream reports were also significantly more wish-fulfilling than the controls’ 
dream reports, were significantly less likely to be classified as nightmares, and had a 
significantly lower word count and narrative item count. These results are consistent with an 
extensive literature that implicates the basolateral amygdala in fear conditioning, emotional 
appraisal and in similar affective processes in waking life (e.g. LeDoux, 2003; Pessoa, 2010).  
The dream reports were also analysed for instances of threat and escape, as well as for 
approach and avoidance behaviour, in order to test some of the hypotheses central to 
Revonsuo’s (2000) threat simulation theory (TST) of dreaming. These analyses produced no 
significant results. Given that the amygdala is essential to Revonsuo’s (2000) 
conceptualisation of dreaming as an evolutionarily adaptive mechanism to safely simulate 
threat avoidance, these findings contradict some of TST’s central predictions.  
In general, these findings suggest that the average dream of persons with bilateral 
basolateral amygdalae damage is significantly simpler, more pleasant, less unpleasant, more 
wish-fulfilling and less likely to be a nightmare than the average control dream. As such, the 
dream reports of the UWD patients seem strikingly similar to the dreams of young children. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
A large body of research and theory in the field of neuropsychology and related 
neurosciences deals with the topic of dreaming. Nevertheless, there is much disagreement 
between theorists regarding the mechanisms and processes involved in dreaming, and many 
unanswered questions remain. One largely unanswered question concerns the role of the 
amygdala in dreaming. This study aimed to shed light on this question by thoroughly 
examining the dreams of patients with bilateral basolateral amygdalae lesions due to Urbach-
Wiethe Disease (UWD), a very rare genetic disorder that can cause calcification of the 
amygdala. 
 
The Amygdala’s Waking Function 
The human amygdala is a small, almond shaped structure located deep within the medial 
temporal lobes. The amygdala is a complex structure made up of various nuclei that can be 
divided up into two major groups: the cortico-medial (or central) and the basolateral region or 
complex (see Figure 1). Some disagreement regarding the amygdala’s exact structural 
organisation remains (LeDoux, 2007). Although the amygdala is clearly not a single mass, 
most researchers treat it as a unitary structure. However, some have argued that the different 
nuclei are in fact structurally and functionally entirely dissociable from one another and 
should not be grouped together at all (Swanson & Petrovich, 1998).  
There is a vast literature on the amygdala, and a full review is neither possible nor 
useful here. I will focus on the link between the amygdala and emotional processing in 
waking life (see Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010, and Pessoa, 2010 for recent reviews), as this is the 
role that most authors attribute to the amygdala in dreaming.  
A multitude of studies have connected the amygdala with affective processes (e.g. 
Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs & Tranel, 2004; Feinstein, Adolphs, 
Damasio & Tranel, 2011; LeDoux, 2003; Yang et al., 2002). These studies have taken many 
forms, but recurrent findings implicate the amygdala in responses to affective visual stimuli, 
fear conditioning, and emotional memory. The amygdala has been most frequently linked to 
negative emotional processes (primarily to fear, and secondarily to anger), although a fair 
body of research has also linked the amygdala to positive emotions (e.g. Adolphs & Tranel, 
2004; LeDoux, 2003; Yang et al., 2002; Siebert, Markowitsch & Bartel, 2003). The amygdala 
has been strongly implicated in both conscious and unconscious fearful and phobic responses 
to stimuli such as spiders or snakes (Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist & Ingvar, 2007). However, 
current thinking is moving away from viewing the amygdala as simply a fear, anger and 
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general emotion centre (Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). The amygdala has more 
recently been conceptualised as a coordinator of cortical functioning during the processing of 
affective stimuli, and as an evolved ‘relevance detector’ (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa, 
2010; Sander, Grafman & Zalla, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 1. The basolateral complex of the amygdala is made up of the basal (Bpc & Bmc), 
lateral (AL) and accessory basal (AB) nuclei of the amygdala. 
 
The Basolateral Amygdala 
The UWD patients examined in this study have damage specifically localised to the 
basolateral complex of the amygdala bilaterally. The basolateral complex is made up of the 
basal, lateral and accessory basal nuclei of the amygdala (see Figure 1).  
Until fairly recently, research on the amygdala in humans has tended to focus mostly 
on the structure as a whole rather than the individual nuclei (LeDoux, 2007). Based chiefly 
on findings in non-primate animals, the basolateral amygdala has been implicated in various 
types of affective processes. Such processes include fear and reward learning, as well as both 
the expression and extinction of conditioned fear (e.g. Adolphs, 2010; Killcross, Robbins, & 
Everitt, 1997; Sierra-Mercado, Padilla-Coreano, & Quirk, 2010). Generally speaking, the 
basolateral complex is thought to be the gateway to the amygdala (the lateral nucleus in 
particular receives input from a large number of brain areas), whereas the central nucleus of 
the amygdala is the chief output region (LeDoux, 2007; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Wilensky, 
Schafe, Kristensen, & LeDoux, 2006). The basolateral amygdala has also been shown to have 
extensive feedback projections to all regions of the visual cortex, with visual input 
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predominantly coming from higher-order visual association cortices (Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa 
& Adolphs, 2010). Based on these findings, Pessoa and Adolphs (2010) suggest that this area 
serves as a zone of convergence for highly processed visual information that is relevant to the 
handling of affective stimuli. Therefore, by virtue of the basolateral amygdala’s direct 
connections to the visual cortex, the amygdala is thought to be able to enhance salient sensory 
processing. 
 
Theories of Emotion and the Amygdala 
Based on the research described above, various affective neuroscientists have attributed a 
crucial role to the amygdala (including the basolateral complex) in theories of emotional 
processing. The most commonly accepted idea is that the amygdala is a critical structure in 
mammal and human fear pathways (Ohman et al., 2007; Panksepp, 1998; Phelps & LeDoux, 
2005), though (as stated above) this idea has recently been challenged. Panksepp (1998; 
2005) suggested that seven ‘basic emotion’ systems (namely the FEAR, RAGE, SEEKING, 
PLAY, GRIEF, CARE and LOSS systems) are structurally and psychologically identifiable 
in all humans and other mammals. The amygdala, along with the periaqueductal grey, are 
considered to be the critical structures in the evolutionarily-primitive FEAR network. 
Panksepp (2014) also proposed that the amygdala may be involved in the RAGE network. 
 
Dreaming and the Amygdala 
The amygdala has been strongly implicated in dreaming by numerous neuroimaging studies. 
The amygdala shows higher activity levels during both REM (e.g. Dang-Vu et al., 2005; 
Maquet et al., 1996; Palagini & Rosenlicht, 2011; Nofzinger, Mintun, Wiseman, Kupfer, & 
Moore, 1997) and non-REM sleep than it does during waking (Nofzinger et al., 2002). 
Maquet et al. (1996) also found that bilateral amygdala activation during REM sleep was 
followed by dream recall on awakening. In addition, cortical areas that are rich in afferent 
connections from the amygdala (such as the anterior cingulate and the right parietal 
operculum) are active during rapid-eye movement (REM) sleep, while areas with low levels 
of afferent connections from the amygdala (such as the prefrontal cortex, other parietal cortex 
and the precuneus) are generally deactivated during REM sleep (Maquet et al. 1996). 
However, the amygdala’s function in dreaming remains poorly understood. 
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Dream Research and the Amygdala 
Very little empirical research exists regarding the amygdala’s function in dreaming. De 
Gennaro et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between quantitative and qualitative 
measures of dreams reported in dream diaries, and the volume and mean diffusivity of the 
amygdala and hippocampus. Increased mean diffusivity of a brain structure is an indication of 
that structure’s decreased structural integrity. These authors argue that the amygdala and 
hippocampus work together to determine the emotional qualities of dreams, and they 
hypothesised that the volume and structural integrity of these grey matter regions would be 
associated with variations in the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of dreams.  
De Gennaro et al. (2011) report that decreased micro-structural integrity of the left 
amygdala was linked to shorter dream reports and lower emotional load in the dream reports. 
However, decreased volume of the right amygdala was associated with increased emotional 
load. They also found that decreased micro-structural integrity, and decreased volume of the 
right amygdala were associated with increased bizarreness in dream reports. The authors 
interpreted these findings as supporting two basic assumptions of Hobson, Pace-Schott and 
Stickgold’s (2000) Activation - Input source - Modulation (AIM) model of dreaming (see 
below). Namely, De Gennaro et al. (2011) found support for Hobson et al.’s (2000) idea that 
the emotional salience of dreams is linked to amygdala activation and their idea that 
bizarreness in dreams is linked to decreased prefrontal inhibition of hippocampal and 
amygdalar functioning. De Gennaro et al. (2011) also proposed that amygdala function 
during dreaming might differ on the basis of hemispheric lateralisation, and that the amygdala 
may be differentially involved in positive and negative dream affect. The authors suggested 
that future research should investigate these possibilities 
Wiest and Brainin (2010) presented three dream reports in their neuropsychoanalytic 
analysis of a single UWD patient with selective bilateral lesions of the amygdala. This paper 
constitutes the first evidence in the literature that patients without a functioning amygdala can 
dream at all. Wiest and Brainin (2010) reported that the patient had difficulty recalling his 
dreams, and that he could not produce any associations to his dreams.  
Lastly, the body of research linking abnormal limbic system activity to nightmares 
and excessive negative emotion in dreaming (e.g. Levin, Fireman & Nielsen, 2010) may be of 
relevance, as the basolateral amygdala forms part of this system. Nielsen (2005) reported that 
the dreams of patients suffering from temporal lobe epilepsy contain more negative emotions, 
as well as more intense emotions, than the dreams of healthy controls. Germain et al. (2013) 
report increased limbic activation in the REM sleep of patients with post-traumatic stress 
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disorder. Some studies have also suggested that the amygdala plays a role in the processing of 
emotional memories during REM sleep and/or dreaming (e.g. Van der Helm et al., 2011). 
 
Dream Theories and the Amygdala. 
In forming ideas about the amygdala’s role in dreaming, dream theorists have drawn chiefly 
on research and theory implicating the amygdala in waking emotional processes (see above), 
as well as observations that link limbic seizure activity to nightmares and highly unpleasant 
dream content. Numerous papers have drawn a link between high levels of amygdala 
activation during REM and the intensity of emotional experiences reported in dreams (e.g. 
Braun et al., 1997; Dang-Vu et al., 2005; De Gennaro, Marzano, Cipolli,, & Ferrara, 2012; 
Maquet et al., 1996; Palagini & Rosenlicht, 2011). Consequently, a number of influential 
neuroscientific dream theorists (Domhoff, 2001; Hobson et al., 2000; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; 
Revonsuo, 2000) have proposed a central role for the amygdala in producing, modulating and 
recalling emotional dream content, experiences, and reactions in dreams, and especially those 
involving negative emotions such as fear and anger. 
The most relevant of these theories are described in more detail below. Although this 
review should ideally focus on the possible role of the basolateral amygdala in dreaming, 
dream theorists have not proposed differential roles for the different nuclei, and have instead 
referred to the amygdala as if it were a unitary structure. However, as demonstrated by the 
research presented above, the basolateral amygdala has been implicated in the majority of the 
affective processes that have been associated with the amygdala as a whole. Therefore, it is 
likely that the basolateral amygdala plays a significant role in whatever processes dream 
theories ascribe to the amygdala as a whole. 
Domhoff (2001; 2011)’s continuity hypothesis of dreaming sees dreaming as being 
continuous on waking thoughts and concerns, and also argues that there is much continuity in 
the themes and events within the multiple dreams of any one individual. Within this theory, 
the amygdala is thought to play a similar role in dreaming to its role in waking life, namely in 
negative emotional processes (Domhoff, 2001). 
Within their Activation Level - Input Source - Mode of Processing (AIM) model of 
dreaming, Hobson et al. (2000) attribute the intensity of emotion in dreams to the high level 
of amygdala activation during recorded REM sleep, while also arguing that the amygdala 
may underlie dreaming’s supposed role in processing emotional memories. Most specifically, 
they state that; “the cortex of the dreaming brain is compelled to process internal signals 
arising from the pons and amygdala ... The limbic lobe may then direct the forebrain to 
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construct dreams” (Hobson et al., 2000, p. 838). Hobson (2004) also suggests that the 
amygdala plays an important role in the development of dream plots. 
Levin and Nielsen (2007) describe the AMPHAC (amygdala, medial prefrontal 
cortex, hippocampus and anterior cingulate cortex) neurophysiologic model of disordered 
dreaming. In 2005, Nielsen and Stenstrom suggested that the amygdala is involved in the 
triggering of memories that form the basis of emotional experiences in dreaming, thereby 
directing dream plots. Levin et al. (2010) go a step further, and put more emphasis on the 
amygdala’s importance in dreaming than on any other brain structure. These authors suggest 
that disordered dreaming, such as nightmares, may be caused by the amygdala becoming 
excessively responsive to fear-related content in dreams. Evidence suggests that the limbic 
system may be over-activated in patients who suffer from severe nightmares (Levin et al., 
2010).   
For Solms (1997; 2000), the mesocortical and mesolimbic dopaminergic pathways, 
which project from the ventral tegmental area of the brain to the frontal areas to the nucleus 
accumbens, and not the amygdala, are the critical pathways for dreaming. These pathways 
make up what Panksepp (1998) labelled the SEEKING system and they are thought to be 
responsible for the positive, appetitive affective urge that drives goal-directed behaviour 
(Alcaro, Huber, & Panksepp, 2007). Although the SEEKING system does project to the 
amygdala, Solms does not propose a key role for the amygdala in the dreaming process. 
However, it is important to recognise that Solms’s model of dreaming was based mainly on 
lesion studies, and it is extremely rare to obtain focal lesions localised to the amygdala 
bilaterally.  
In contrast to Solms, the threat simulation theory of dreaming (TST) developed by 
Revonsuo (2000), places a good deal of importance on the amygdala’s role in dreaming. 
Threat simulation theory approaches dreaming from an evolutionary perspective, 
hypothesising that dreams are evolutionarily adaptive in that they constitute opportunities for 
the mind to practice (in safety) how to react to threatening situations quickly and effectively. 
In this theory, dreaming essentially entails threat simulation, which is thought to be generated 
by what Panksepp (1998) called the FEAR system. Given that the basolateral amygdala is the 
central part of the FEAR system, it should play a crucial role in Revonsuo’s (2000) 
conceptualisation of dreaming. According to TST, the very purpose of dreaming is the 
priming of this amygdalocortical network – that is to say, fear conditioning (Zadra, 
Desjardins, & Marcotte, 2006). Threat simulation theory is called into question by evidence 
that experiences of realistic life-threatening events in dreams are rare, and that the successful 
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avoidance of these threats is even rarer (Malcolm-Smith & Solms, 2004; Malcolm-Smith, 
Solms, Turnbull, & Tredoux, 2008; Zadra et al., 2006). On the contrary, it has been reported 
that incidence of ‘approach’ dreams are more common than ‘avoidance’ dreams in 
populations living in both low- and high-threat environments (Malcolm-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
Urbach-Wiethe Disease  
Investigating the dreams of patients with amygdala damage presents a unique avenue for 
exploring the aforementioned theoretical predictions regarding the amygdala’s role in 
dreaming. Generally, the only patients who regularly have brain damage specifically 
localised to the amygdala bilaterally are patients with an extremely rare genetic condition 
known as Urbach-Wiethe Disease (UWD) or Lipoid Proteinosis. Less than 300 cases of 
UWD have been reported in the world literature since Urbach and Wiethe first described the 
condition in 1929 (Cote, 1998; Thornton et al., 2008). UWD is caused by a mutation of the 
ECMI gene (Claeys et al., 2007). Given that this genetic mutation has been mapped, UWD is 
diagnosed using a genetic test that searches for this particular mutation. A group of about 30 
patients living in small, rural communities in an area known as Namaqualand in the Northern 
Cape Province of South Africa constitute the largest known population of UWD patients 
anywhere in the world (Van Hougenhouck-Tulleken et al., 2004).  
Despite there being a fair amount of clinical variation among UWD patients, the most 
striking symptoms typically arise from protein deposits that form small lumps on the skin and 
vocal chords, the latter resulting in a hoarse voice (Appenzeller et al., 2006; Claeys et al., 
2007; Cote, 1998). In addition, symmetrical bilateral damage to the medial temporal lobes 
exists in more than half of all patients diagnosed with UWD. Most often this damage affects 
the amygdala, although in some cases it also spreads to surrounding brain structures. The 
calcifications generally develop over time, and the extent to which damage progresses is 
highly variable (Siebert et al., 2003; Thornton et al., 2008). Most of the UWD patients living 
in Namaqualand have brain damage that is localised specifically to the basolateral amygdala 
bilaterally. Another common neurological symptom of UWD is epilepsy (Claeys et al., 2007). 
 
Research with UWD Patients 
Investigating the cognition, affect, and behaviour of UWD patients (assuming that MRI 
scanning has confirmed amygdala calcification) provides a unique opportunity to answer 
questions about amygdala function. Many researchers have done exactly this, and much of 
what is recognized about the effects of amygdala dysfunction (see above) is based on such 
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studies. Probably the most well-known example of research with UWD patients is the 
detailed study of the patient SM, who has complete amygdala lesions due to UWD. Since the 
publication 20 years ago of their influential paper on SM’s impaired recognition of emotion 
facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1994), Adolphs and his colleagues have published many 
more papers on this patient’s affective functioning.  
However, a heavy reliance on single case studies and small sample sizes in studies 
with UWD patients, along with the varying degrees of amygdala damage in different patients, 
detracts from the generalizability of this literature. Given this history, the size of the UWD 
population living in Namaqualand, South Africa is exceptional in its potential to significantly 
impact the field of amygdala lesion research.   
 
Dreaming in UWD Patients 
To date, the only published literature involving the dreams of UWD patients is Wiest and 
Brainin (2010)’s neuropsychoanalytic study of a single UWD patient, which reported that the 
patient did indeed dream. No systematic investigation into the dreaming of UWD patients 
exists, yet studying these patients can clearly shed light on the role of the amygdala in 
dreaming. Studying UWD patients also provides an ideal opportunity to test the idea that the 
amygdala is involved in the affective formation of dreams, as well as some of the claims 
central to Revonsuo’s TST. 
Domhoff (2001) specifically recommended that the dreams of patients with damaged 
amygdalae be studied, hypothesising that such dreams would show a significantly lower 
proportion of negative emotion relative to positive emotion than the dreams of healthy 
individuals. Two previous student projects at the University of Cape Town (Denny, 2011; 
Koopowitz, 2012; both unpublished) have attempted such investigations; however, due to a 
number of methodological shortcomings, these studies failed to generate any significant 
results.  
Pilot Research. The present study’s preliminary findings (submitted as an Honours 
dissertation at the University of Cape Town) also found no significant differences between 
the dream reports of UWD patients and those of a matched control group. Qualitatively, 
however, the UWD patients’ dream reports did seem to differ somewhat from the dream 
reports of the control participants. As might be expected, many of the UWD patients’ dream 
reports did appear to be less unpleasant than the control dream reports. More surprisingly, 
many of the UWD patients’ dream reports seemed to be very simple, wish-fulfilling dreams. 
These dream reports seemed devoid of the anxious and bizarre distortions that Freud 
18 
(1900/1954) conceptualized as ‘censorship’ in the dreams of normal adults. Given prevailing 
ideas about the amygdala’s role in anxiety, it is possible to speculate that basolateral 
amygdala damage could result in a decrease in these anxious reactions, and hence, lead to 
dreams which are on average more wish-fulfilling than is normal. 
Given these qualitative observations (as well as the literature reviewed above), it is 
highly possible that the pilot research was unable to discover statistical significance due to 
methodological issues, and not because there are in fact no differences between the dreams of 
UWD patients and the dreams of healthy controls. Indeed, the pilot research was influenced 
by a number of methodological shortcomings, including; small sample size, insufficient 
contextual information to properly code the dream reports, problems with the measurement 
techniques, and problems with the statistical analyses.  
In addition, it seems that the dream reports used in the pilot studies were inadequately 
extracted from the interviews as a whole. That is to say, some information that may have 
aided in the understanding of the dream reports was not included, and some irrelevant 
information (which appeared to be part of the dream reports) was included, which would 
have hampered accurate coding of the dreams. In addition, all of the dreams were reported in 
Afrikaans, and part of the problem may have been that the preparation of the dream reports 
for analysis was done by students who were not fluent in Afrikaans.  
Various dream researchers, including Colace (2010), have argued that background 
information about a dreamer’s waking life is necessary in order to accurately interpret their 
dream reports. This was lacking in the pilot research. 
Conceptualising the amygdala’s role in dreaming. In summary, the existing 
literature suggests that the amygdala may play an important role in dreaming, but this claim is 
based on very limited direct empirical evidence. Unpublished pilot research has failed to find 
significant differences between UWD patients’ dreams and the dreams of control participants, 
but this is difficult to interpret due to methodological issues such as small sample size, 
measurement difficulties, and inadequate statistical analyses. Building on the lessons learnt in 
the preliminary research, it is now possible to conduct a more extensive and rigorous 
investigation of the basolateral amygdala’s role in dreaming. 
 
Rationale for the Present Research 
As demonstrated in the above literature review, very little published empirical research 
regarding the amygdala’s role in dreaming exists, and none exists regarding the effects of 
bilateral amygdala damage on dreaming. Nevertheless, according to several dream theorists, 
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this structure may potentially play an important role in dreaming, particularly in the 
generation of affective dream plots. Indeed, some dream theories (particularly Revonsuo’s) 
seem to be heavily reliant on assumptions regarding the amygdala’s function in dreaming, 
and yet these claims are essentially untested. 
The presence of a relatively large community of UWD patients living in the Northern 
Cape Province of South Africa provides a unique opportunity to address this knowledge gap 
and test these theories. Most of these patients have brain lesions localised specifically to the 
basolateral amygdala bilaterally. Not only is the specificity of damage to this particular brain 
area very rare, the size of this particular clinical population is unprecedented. 
An extensive empirical examination of dreaming in this patient population would 
provide the first clear picture of the effects of bilateral basolateral amygdala damage on 
dreaming, and would thereby begin to address the paucity of scientific evidence regarding the 
amygdala’s role in dreaming. Such evidence may in turn prove highly informative to the field 
of dream theory. A large, rigorous investigation is therefore required, and such research needs 
to circumvent the methodological problems previously encountered.  
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CHAPTER 2 - SPECIFIC AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The central aim of the present study was to examine, as broadly as possible, the formal 
characteristics of relative aspects of dreaming in patients with UWD.  I aimed to achieve this 
by collecting dream reports from UWD patients and a group of matched healthy controls, 
which three research assistants subsequently rated on a number of measures designed to 
investigate the theoretically relevant aspects of dreaming. The ultimate goal was to 
determine, with as much confidence as possible, whether there were any significant 
differences, on any of these measures, between the dreams of patients with UWD and those 
of matched healthy controls. Specifically, I aimed to test the common idea that the amygdala 
plays a role in the development of dream plots, and in the intensity of negative (particularly 
threat related) emotional experiences in dreams, and possibly in affective dream experiences 
more generally. 
In order to achieve this degree of confidence in the results, this study built on the 
methodological experience gained by preliminary research. I therefore aimed to not only 
collect a larger sample of dream reports than I and the other UCT students were previously 
able to do, but also to collect background information about the research participants. I then 
aimed to present this to the research assistants as clearly, accurately, and completely as 
possible. Furthermore, I aimed to systematically review and refine all the dream coding 
measures developed by these students prior to the analysis of the dream reports.  
Given that no previously published investigation into the effects of amygdala damage 
on dreams exists, and that the preliminary student research returned results of limited 
reliability, there was a restricted basis on which to form specific directional hypotheses. 
Therefore, the central hypothesis was simply that the dream reports of UWD patients would 
differ significantly to the dream reports of control participants on at least some of the 
theoretically relevant measures tested. The formal dream characteristics assessed by each of 
these measures, as well as a brief reminder of the rationale for their inclusion, are presented 
below.  
1. The intensity of positive and negative affect in the dream report. The literature reviewed 
above presents significant theoretical and empirical grounds to suppose that the amygdala 
could play a role in the generation of intense negative emotion in dreams. The amygdala 
apparently also plays a role in positive emotional processes, although the nature of this 
role is less clear. This measure therefore aimed to assess the role of the basolateral 
amygdala in the generation of positive and negative dream affect. 
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2. Panksepp’s seven basic emotions in the dream report. Research regarding the amygdala’s 
waking function has suggested that the structure might be particularly involved in FEAR 
and RAGE processes. However, some research has also suggested that the amygdala may 
be involved in affective processes more generally. This study therefore aimed to assess 
the intensity of each of Panksepp’s basic emotions in order to provide a broad 
understanding of the effects of bilateral basolateral amygdalae damage on dream affect.  
3. The extent to which the dream report constituted the fulfilment of a wish. Based on the 
qualitative observations made in preliminary research, the present study aimed to assess 
whether the bilateral basolateral amygdala plays a role in wish fulfilment in dreams. 
4. Whether the dream report could be classified as a nightmare. If patients with basolateral 
amygdala damage experience decreased negative emotions in their dreams, it may follow 
that they experience fewer nightmares. Furthermore, dream theorists have suggested that 
the amygdala plays a role in the generation of nightmares. Therefore, the current study 
aimed to test whether bilateral basolateral amygdala damage had any impact on the 
occurrence of nightmares. 
5. The content analysis of bizarre elements in the dream report. De Genarro et al. (2011) 
found that reduced amygdala volume and structural integrity led to an increase in dream 
bizarreness. However, my initial qualitative observations in my preliminary research 
suggested that UWD patients’ dream reports were generally relatively simple and non-
bizarre. This study therefore aimed to gain a clearer understanding on the amygdala’s 
possible role in dream bizarreness.  
6. The word and narrative item count of the dream report. The literature provides some 
support for the idea that amygdala is involved in the generation of dream plots. 
Qualitatively, in my preliminary studies, it seemed that the UWD patients’ dream reports 
were indeed shorter than control participants’ dream reports. The present study therefore 
aimed to test this observation statistically, and also to determine whether the shorter 
dream reports were reflective of less narratively-complex dreams. 
7. The incidence of threat and escape in the dream report. Revonsuo’s (2000) TST would 
predict that patients with amygdala damage will exhibit fewer instances of threat and 
escape in their dreams. This study therefore aimed to test whether or not TST’s 
predictions regarding the amygdala’s role in threat-related dream activity hold true. 
8. The incidence of approach versus avoidance behaviour in the dream report. Threat 
simulation theory views threat-avoidance behaviours as the cornerstone of dream 
behaviour, and the amygdala as being responsible for these behaviours (Revonsuo, 2000). 
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Approach behaviour, which is associated with the SEEKING system, provides a good 
contrast to threat-avoidance behaviour, which is associated with the FEAR system. This 
study therefore aimed to assess whether, in line with TST, patients with bilateral 
basolateral amygdala damage will display lower incidence of avoidance behaviour 
(relative to approach behaviour) than healthy individuals. 
Based on the literature and preliminary observations mentioned above, a number of 
more specific, directional hypotheses were formed, namely. 
1. The dreams of patients with UWD will show a significantly lower mean degree of 
negative emotion than the dreams of control participants. 
2. The dreams of patients with UWD will show a significantly lower mean degree of FEAR 
than the dreams of control participants. 
3. The dreams of patients with UWD will show a significantly lower mean degree of RAGE 
than the dreams of control participants. 
4. The dreams of patients with UWD will show a significantly higher mean degree of wish 
fulfilment than the dreams of control participants. 
5. Significantly fewer of the UWD patient’s dreams than the control participants’ dreams 
will be classified as nightmares. 
6. The dreams of patients with UWD will have a significantly lower word count than the 
dreams of control participants. 
7. The dreams of patients with UWD will have a significantly lower narrative item count 
than the dreams of control participants. 
In addition, this study also set out to test the following hypotheses generated by 
Revonsuo’s TST: 
1. There will be significantly fewer instances of threat in the dreams of patients with UWD 
than in the dreams of control participants. 
2. Patients with UWD will successfully escape significantly fewer of the threats in their 
dreams than the control participants. 
3. The dreams of patients with UWD will show significantly fewer instances of avoidance 
behaviour than the dreams of control participants. 
Due to the limitations of the existing evidence, I did not make specific predictions 
regarding the effect of bilateral basolateral amygdala damage on: the intensity of positive 
affect; the intensity of Panksepps’ remaining five basic emotions; or the prevalence of bizarre 
elements in the dream reports.  
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODS 
Design and Setting 
This was a multi-method, quasi-experimental study examining the relationship between 
amygdala damage (the independent variable) and dream form and content (the dependent 
variable). To achieve this, the dreams of participants with UWD were compared to those of 
healthy controls on a variety of measures.  
The study consisted of three major stages, namely the preliminary stage, during which 
I re-examined data collected during pilot research and refined various measures; the data 
collection stage, during which an intermediary collected new dream reports, and the data 
coding stage, during which research assistants coded the dream reports on the various 
measures. The preliminary stage and the data analysis stage took place in the Psychology 
Department at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and the data collection stage took place 
in the Namaqualand region of the Northern Cape. 
 
Sample 
The sample comprised eight UWD patients and seventeen matched, healthy controls. Six of 
the UWD patients were recruited for the initial stages of this project in 2011, and two of them 
were newly recruited in 2013. The inclusion criteria for the UWD group were a diagnosis of 
UWD (based on genetic tests and the presence of standard symptoms of UWD), and the 
presence of bilateral basolateral amygdala lesions, as confirmed by MRI (see APPENDIX A). 
There was a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the UWD participants in that, due to 
factors of geographical isolation, they all came from similar communities in Namaqualand, 
near Springbok in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa. They were all coloured1, 
Afrikaans speaking individuals, who were of low socio-economic status, and had low-to-
average IQ scores. The control group for this study comprised 17 healthy individuals who 
were living in the same communities as the UWD patients, and who were matched on all 
demographic measures. 
Exclusion criteria for this study were: being younger than 18 years, having a history 
of alcoholism, having an IQ of less than 70, and having any psychiatric or neurological 
diagnoses apart from UWD. Children were excluded because the amygdala lesions associated 
                                                 
 
1 This is a conventional term in South Africa to describe individuals of mixed race. It does not carry the 
same offensive connotations it does elsewhere in the world. 
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with UWD are usually only fully developed by adulthood (Siebert et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
dreaming probably depends at least in part on forebrain structures that are not yet fully 
developed in childhood, and children’s dreams have been shown to be significantly different 
to the dreams of adults (Domhoff, 2001). Alcohol abuse was also used as an exclusion 
criterion, as alcohol can significantly damage various brain structures, especially the frontal 
lobes and the diencephalon, which leads to functional impairments most notable in memory 
processes. This could obviously impair dream recall (Moselhy, Georgiou, & Kahn, 2001). In 
addition, alcohol abuse has also been shown to effect sleeping patterns and can lead to sleep 
disorders (Roehrs & Roth, 2001).  
Although ten UWD participants had originally been recruited at the outset of this 
project, two male UWD patients had to be excluded due to alcoholism. Alcoholism is 
widespread in the rural Northern Cape communities where these patients live, especially 
among the men. In addition, one of the female patients had to be excluded due to extensive 
brain lesions beyond the basolateral amygdalae, as well as a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Another patient had to be excluded due to a diagnosis of clinical depression and 
nightly use of sleeping medications, which left her unable to recall dreams. This brought the 
original sample of UWD patients down to six participants. 
Due to improved recruitment opportunities in 2013, two new female UWD patients 
were included. The final UWD patient group therefore comprised eight female patients, 
between the ages of 28 and 65 (M = 41.63, SD = 11.90) who had FSIQ scores ranging 
between 73 and 98 (M = 84.88, SD = 7.24). Despite the differences in age between the 
patients, and the potentially progressive nature of the medial temporal calcifications in UWD, 
all of them had circumscribed damage limited to the basolateral nuclei of the amygdala 
bilaterally. The control group comprised 17 women between the ages of 23 and 70 (M = 
40.76, SD = 12.57), who had FSIQ scores ranging between 80 and 100 (M = 85.88, SD = 
5.10). 
 
Materials  
The following materials were utilised. 
 
FSIQ 
An abbreviated version of the Full Scale IQ test was used to assess the participants’ IQs. This 
version has previously been shown to be reliable amongst this specific population.  
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The Most Recent Dream (MRD) Method 
Due to the geographical isolation of the patients being investigated, it was deemed too 
difficult to bring the participants to a sleep laboratory. Dream reports were therefore collected 
in the participants’ homes, using the MRD method of dream report collection. The MRD is a 
viable alternative to collecting dreams in a laboratory (Domhoff, 2000). The MRD method 
asks the participants to recall the most recent dream that they can remember having, no 
matter how long ago the dream actually occurred (Avila-White, Schneider, & Domhoff, 
1999). Participants are asked to pay attention to details such as settings, characters, and 
emotions (see APPENDIX B).  
 
Coding Measures 
Various coding measures were used to analyse the dream reports. A short description of each 
of these measures is provided below, and they are explained in more detail in the coding 
instructions provided in APPENDIX C. 
The positive and negative affect scale. This scale was created for the purposes of the 
present study, and is based on the affective dream scale (see below). It was designed to 
measure the intensity of positive affect (characterised as all pleasant emotion) and negative 
affect (characterised as all negative emotion) in the dreams reports. It uses the same 0-3 scale 
as the ADS, where 0 = these emotions were absent; 1 = very little of these emotions were 
present; 2 = a moderate amount of these emotions were present; and 3 = these emotions were 
very intense. The positive and negative affect scale was tested and refined during the pilot 
stages of the study.  
The affective dream scale (ADS). This scale has been successfully used to assess 
basic emotions in dreams in previous research in the Psychology Department at UCT (D. 
Wainstein, personal communication, August 31, 2012). The ADS has been developed and 
validated over the course of a number of projects in the UCT psychology department. The 
scale measures the intensity of the seven basic emotion systems, as identified by Panksepp 
(1998), on the 0-3 scale described above. These basic emotions are FEAR, SEEKING, 
RAGE, GRIEF, PLAY, LUST and CARE.  
The wish-fulfilment scale. This scale measured to what extent each dream report 
constituted the fulfilment of a wish, and was also developed and refined during the pilot 
stages of the present study. It uses a similar 0-3 scale to the ADS, although in this case 0 = 
this dream includes no wish-fulfilling elements; 1 = this dream has some elements of wish 
fulfilment but is predominantly not a wish fulfilling dream; 2 = this dream includes a clear 
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wish-fulfilment but also includes other aspects; and 3 = this dream is completely wish-
fulfilling. 
Incidence of nightmares. This measure was included in order to investigate whether 
there was a difference between the frequencies of nightmares experienced by the UWD 
patients versus the controls. The incidence of nightmares was recorded by simply asking the 
research assistants to make a nominal judgement of whether or not the dream report in 
question could be labelled a nightmare. They were asked to make this decision based on a 
common-sense understanding of what nightmares are, and were provided with the following 
description in order to aid their decision: ‘Nightmares are dreams marked by intensified 
feelings of dread or terror or other highly disturbing or unpleasant emotions, often with vivid 
visual imagery, these feelings are so intense that they typically cause the individual to wake 
up’. Given that there has been a general failure in the nightmare literature to agree on a single 
definition of the term, the description provided to the raters consisted of a combination of a 
number of influential definitions (Levin et al., 2010; Nielsen, 2005). 
The content analysis of bizarre elements in dreams. Bizarreness in the dream 
reports was measured using Revonsuo and Salmivalli’s (1995) method for the content 
analysis of bizarre elements in dreams. This scale has been shown to have high reliability and 
is believed to be more sensitive to various different types of bizarreness than previous scales 
have been (Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995; Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002). This is a nominal 
coding system that requires raters to first identify all the content elements in each dream 
report (i.e. all the selves, places, times, persons, animals, body parts, plants, objects, events, 
actions, language, cognitions, emotions and sensations). The raters then determined whether 
each content element was non-bizarre, distorted, exotic, impossible, vague or discontinuous. 
Definitions of each of these categories are given in APPENDIX C.  
Word and narrative item count. These two measures were developed and 
successfully utilised for the purpose of previous dream research in the UCT Psychology 
Department (Y. Gartner, personal communication, May 31, 2013), and were adapted slightly 
for the present study. This particular method was chosen as it has demonstrated very high 
inter-rater reliability, provided raters spend some time practising coding before the actual 
analysis. Basically, these scales require raters to count the number of words and the number 
of narrative items in the dream reports, thereby providing a measure of the length and 
narrative complexity of the dream reports. As well as being applied to the 84 dream reports, 
these measures were also applied to a sample of fifteen ‘happy memories’, which were 
analysed for the purpose of providing a comparison to the dream reports. 
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Incidence of threat and escape. This measurement was included in order to test 
predictions based on Revonsuo’s (2000) TST of dreaming. The method used was the same as 
was effectively applied by Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004), and Malcolm-Smith et al. 
(2008). This method involves asking the raters to make a series of five judgements 
concerning the presence and nature of threat and escape in each dream report. 
Classification of approach versus avoidance behaviour. This method was 
employed by Malcolm-Smith et al. (2012) in order to test another aspect of TST. It provides a 
manner of assessing the prevalence of threat-avoidance behaviours in dream reports by 
contrasting the incidence of threat-avoidance to the incidence of a comparable instinctual-
emotional behaviour, namely approach behaviour. ‘Avoidance’ behaviour was defined as, 
“the main activity of the subject of the dream is an attempt to avoid something through 
fleeing, freezing, hiding or the like”; and approach behaviour was defined as, “the main 
action of the subject of the dream is an attempt to approach something through engagement, 
exploration, curiosity or the like” (Malcolm-Smith et al., 2012, p. 409). 
 
Research Team 
Intermediary 
All contact with the research participants was undertaken through Sister M, a first-language 
Afrikaans speaking nurse from a similar cultural background to the participants, who had 
worked extensively with these UWD patients (as well as the control participants) for the 
purposes of previous research. Although I can speak Afrikaans myself, it was especially 
important that the UWD patients speak to an interviewer with whom they felt comfortable, as 
they can be quite self-conscious about their skin and voice problems. 
 
Research Assistants  
Three research assistants coded all of the dream reports. These assistants remained blind to 
both the study’s hypotheses and the patients’ diagnoses. They all held Honours degrees in 
Psychology from UCT, and were first-language Afrikaans speakers. 
 
Procedure 
Preliminary Stage 
During the pilot research, 16 dream reports from eight UWD patients, and 24 dream reports 
from 17 controls were analysed. The first stage of the present study focused on re-examining 
these participants and their dream reports. This was done in order to ensure that the dream 
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reports analysed in the present study were as accurate and informative as possible. It was 
discovered that two of the UWD patients were unsuitable for inclusion in the present study 
(see above), and the three dream reports that had been collected from these two patients were 
discarded (thus leaving 13 dream reports collected from six UWD patients). Two new UWD 
patients were recruited in their place. 
Many of the previously collected dream reports had been collected as part of a more 
comprehensive interview, which was conducted for the purposes of other student research. 
These interviews were now inspected for any relevant personal, social or environmental 
information that could aid in coding the dream reports. In addition, Sister M was asked to 
provide relevant information that she felt would aid in the coding of the dream reports. For 
example, where a participant mentioned a daughter in a dream, Sister M informed us that the 
child in question was disabled. Therefore, the word ‘my [disabled] daughter’ was inserted 
into the relevant report. 
During these more comprehensive interviews, six of the UWD patients and sixteen of 
the controls were also specifically asked to report a nightmare in addition to a normal dream 
report (the remaining two UWD patients and one control were never specifically asked about 
nightmares). These nightmares were collected for the purposes of a different study, which is 
why not all of this study’s participants were systematically asked this question. However, the 
decision was made to include these nightmares in aspects of this study’s analyses, as 
excluding them completely could potentially have led to erroneous conclusions. For example, 
it might have been concluded that the UWD patients did not have nightmares, when in fact 
nightmares had been recorded for the specific purposes of another study.  
The remaining dream reports were then prepared for coding. It appears that in the 
preliminary studies mentioned above, the dream reports given to the research assistants were 
poorly extracted from the interview as a whole. All of the dream reports were therefore 
rewritten, ensuring that they were clearly presented, that all available information that might 
aid the coding process was included, and that all verbalisation that was not part of the dream 
report was excluded. Any additional relevant information that had been uncovered from the 
interviews, or had been provided by sister M, was incorporated into the dream reports in 
parentheses. 
Lastly, the coding measures used by the pilot studies to analyse the dream reports 
were re-examined and modified based on any difficulties encountered in the pilot studies.  
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Data Collection Stage 
During this stage, new dream reports were collected in the participants’ homes through a 
structured clinical interview conducted by Sister M. The interview began by Sister M 
explaining that she was visiting them for the purposes of collecting a dream report, and 
asking them whether they knew what a dream was and whether they were currently 
dreaming. She then proceeded to ask them to report a dream, using the MRD method 
instructions. Though it is customary to collect a written MRD report, some of the study 
participants were not fully literate. For this reason, all the reports were collected orally, 
recorded on a voice recorder, and subsequently transcribed by myself.  
In this manner, thirteen new dream reports were collected from the UWD disease 
patients, and 27 new dream reports were collected from control participants. The transcribed 
dream reports were then prepared for coding in the same manner as the dream reports that 
had been collected previously. This provided a total of 26 dream reports collected from eight 
UWD patients, and 58 dream reports collected from seventeen control participants. 
 
Data Coding Stage  
The research assistants coded the dream reports (which I presented to them in a random 
order) using the measures outlined under ‘Materials’ (see above). The full coding instructions 
given to the assistants are available in APPENDIX C.  
The research assistants worked individually for most of the measures, although two 
measures were coded by consensus. For each measure, the assistants were trained to ensure 
that they were all coding in the same manner. To this end, they were given a set of ten 
practice dreams to code. These practice dreams were taken from an on-line dream database 
(http://www.dreambank.net).  
For the measures that were coded individually, inter-rater reliability was calculated. 
For the categorical measures (i.e. the nightmare, bizarreness, threat and approach/avoidance 
coding), Domhoff’s (1996) percentage of perfect agreement was used. Domhoff (1996) 
recommends the use of this stringent measure of inter-rater reliability for nominal coding in 
dream research, and argues that other measures of inter-rater reliability are inappropriate for 
such coding. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated for the continuous 
measures (i.e. the affect and wish fulfilment scales and the word and narrative item counts). 
This measure of inter-rater reliability is commonly used for ordinal data and has consistently 
been recommended by statisticians for psychological research (Hallgren, 2012). Specifically, 
two-way absolute agreement average-measures ICCs were calculated. For each coding 
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measure, a minimum inter-rater reliability of either 80% perfect agreement or ICC = .8 was 
achieved on the practice dreams before the raters began coding the dream reports collected 
from the research participants. If the raters did not achieve the minimum inter-rater reliability 
on the first set of ten practice dreams, they kept coding new sets of practice dreams until they 
were able to reach the required level of inter-rater reliability. The raters then moved onto 
coding the actual dream reports and happy memories, and once this was complete inter-rater 
reliability was checked once again. If the inter-rater reliability had fallen below 80% perfect 
agreement or ICC = .8 for the analyses of the actual reports, the raters coding decisions were 
re-examined in order to determine for which reports their decisions had differed most 
severely from one another. The offending reports were then recoded by consensus among the 
three research assistants. 
The ADS and the bizarreness measure were coded by consensus due to the 
complicated and subjective nature of the judgements that these scales required. It was 
foreseen that the research assistants would not be able to achieve the desired 80% perfect 
agreement if they coded these measures individually. Prior to the main coding, the raters still 
coded ten practice dreams for these two measures. It was ensured that the raters were, 
through discussion, able to agree on 100% of the decisions made. 
The word and narrative item count scales were also applied to 15 ‘happy memories’, 
which were collected orally from a subset of the participants. Eight happy memories were 
collected from control participants, and seven from the UWD patients. These happy 
memories were originally collected alongside sad, angry and scary memories during an 
interview conducted for the purposes of another study. These happy memories constituted 
narratives that were most readily comparable to dream narratives. (The happy memories were 
used, as opposed to the sad, angry or scary memories, as not all the participants were able to 
recall a sad, angry or scary memory. The happy memories therefore provided the biggest 
possible sample size of alternative narratives to compare to the dream reports.) The happy 
memories were subjected to a word and narrative item count in order to provide a comparison 
to the word and narrative item counts of the dream reports. It was hoped that this would 
illuminate whether any between-group differences in the length and narrative complexity of 
the dream reports were unique to dreams, or whether similar types of differences could be 
observed in the length and narrative complexity of a different type of report.  
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Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval for this study had already been granted prior to its commencement, as it 
formed part of an ongoing research project. The original ethical approval was obtained by Dr. 
Barak Morgan from Stellenbosch University (see APPENDIX D). This broader research 
project incorporates various studies, all examining UWD patients. 
During the collection of the dream reports, each participant was read a copy of the 
Participant Information Sheet (which doubled as an informed consent form). This form 
explained the purpose of the study and highlighted that participation was entirely voluntary, 
that the participants could withdraw at any time, and that any information that they provided 
would be kept entirely confidential. An English translation of the Afrikaans sheet is attached 
(see APPENDIX E). No potential harm was foreseen for the participants who took part in this 
study. Nonetheless, debriefing and counselling were made available to the participants. Given 
that the interviews were conducted by sister M (who the participants were comfortable and 
familiar with), she was able to help the participants with any issues that came up during their 
interview. She was also available for the participants to contact at any stage. 
 
Data Analysis 
All statistics were conducted on SPSS version 21 and 22, or R version 3.0.1.  Both 
continuous data (collected using the affect and wish-fulfilment scales, as well as the word and 
narrative item counts) and categorical data (the classification of bizarre dream elements; the 
incidence of nightmares, threat and escape; and the classification of approach versus 
avoidance behaviour) were descriptively and inferentially analysed. The UWD patient group 
was compared to the control group on each of these measures. All statistical analyses were 
run both with and without the specially requested ‘nightmares’ (see ‘Procedure’ section for 
an explanation) in order to determine whether this would produce different results. There 
were no instances in any of the analyses where excluding the ‘nightmares’ meant the 
difference between a significant and a non-significant result. 
Given that three to four dream reports were collected from each participant, there was 
a possibility that dreams from the same participant may have been related to each other in 
some way. This would threaten assumption of independence of data – which is critical to the 
reliability of the statistical analyses run. Therefore, a multilevel modelling approach was used 
to determine whether significant variation existed between the different participants. 
However, in each analysis that was run, it was found that there was no significant variation at 
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the participant level. It was therefore not necessary to continue with a multilevel modelling 
approach and it was possible to treat the data as independent (Bliese, 2013). 
 
Continuous Data  
The continuous data was analysed by means of independent samples t-tests that compared the 
UWD patients’ scores to the controls’ scores on the various measures.  For the intensity of 
positive and negative affect, Panksepp’s seven basic emotions, and one of the word count 
analyses, the data was not normally distributed and Mann-Whitney tests were therefore 
performed instead of t-tests. Means and standard deviations were calculated for all tests, and 
for the non-parametric tests medians and range were also calculated. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (r) was calculated in order to provide a measure of the effect size. The reported 
effect size is positive where it reflects a higher score for the UWD patients than the control 
participants, and negative where it reflects a lower score for the UWD patients than the 
control participants. 
 
Categorical Data 
The categorical data was analysed by means of Pearson’s chi-square tests of contingency that 
compared the UWD patients’ data to the control groups’ data. Cramer’s V and the odds-ratio 
were calculated in order to measure effect size. Once again, a positive Cramer’s V reflects 
that the characteristic in question is more common among the UWD patients’ dream reports 
than the control dream reports, and a negative Cramer’s V reflects that the characteristic is 
less common among the UWD patients’ dream reports. Standardised residuals and adjusted 
standardized residuals were analysed in order to determine the specific location of any 
effects. 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
In addition, I ran a principal components analysis with an oblique rotation in order to 
determine whether the large number of independent variables being measured could be 
reduced into a smaller number of common factors, thereby improving the understanding of 
the data. Mann-Whitney tests (chosen because the data was not normally distributed) were 
then used to compare the UWD patients’ scores to the control participants’ scores on the 
components that emerged. 
 
 
33 
CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS 
Intensity of Positive and Negative Affect 
Positive Affect 
The inter-rater reliability criteria were met for this measure, as an excellent intra-class 
correlation (ICC) was achieved for the ten practice dreams, ICC = .98; as well as for the 
analysis of the actual dream reports collected from the study participants, ICC = .91. As is 
shown in Table 1, the UWD patients had a higher mean positive affect score than the control 
participants did. A one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test indicated that this difference was 
significant, U = 475, p = .003, r = .30.  
 
Negative Affect 
Inter-rater reliability, as measured by the ICC, was excellent for both the practice dream 
reports, ICC = .90; and for the study dream reports, ICC = .91. The UWD patients had a 
lower mean negative affect score than the control participants (see Table 1). A one-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U test indicated that UWD patients’ dream reports showed a significantly 
lower degree of negative affect  than the control participants’ dream reports, in line with this 
study’s hypothesis to that effect, U = 571.5, p = .037, r = -.20. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Positive and Negative Affect 
 
Measure 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Positive affect 
 
 
Negative affect 
 
1.47 (1.05) 
1.33 (3) 
 
1.12 (0.97) 
1.17 (2.67) 
 
0.80 (0.98) 
0.33 (3) 
 
1.6 (1.11) 
2 (3) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below given that a non-parametric test was run. 
 
Panksepp’s Seven Basic Emotions  
Inter-rater reliability was not calculated for this measure, as it was coded by consensus. None 
of the reported dreams showed any instances of LUST, so this basic emotion was omitted 
from the analysis. As is seen in Table 2, no RAGE was observed in any of the UWD patients’ 
dream reports, while on average a small amount was observed in the controls’ dream reports. 
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This difference was significant, U = 624, p = .019, r = -.24, which is in line with this study’s 
hypothesis that the UWD patients’ dream reports would show a reduced degree of RAGE. 
Table 2 also shows that the UWD patients’ dream reports had a higher mean PLAY score 
than the controls’ dream reports, and this difference was also significant, U = 603, p = .046, r 
= .19. For all the other basic emotions, the controls’ dream reports were found to have 
slightly higher means than the UWD patients’ dream reports, but none of these differences 
were significant. This study therefore failed to confirm the hypothesis that the UWD patients’ 
dream reports would show a significantly lower intensity of FEAR than the control 
participants’ dream reports. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Basic Emotions 
 
Emotion 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
RAGE 
 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
 
0.33 (0.803) 
0 (3) 
 
FEAR 
 
 
1.08 (1.23) 
1 (3) 
 
1.34 (1.358) 
1 (3) 
 
GRIEF 
 
 
0.46 (0.905) 
0 (3) 
 
0.57 (1.045) 
0 (3) 
 
SEEKING 
 
 
0.81 (0.939) 
0 (2) 
 
1.19 (1.206) 
1 (3) 
 
PLAY 
 
 
1.15 (1.377) 
0 (3) 
 
0.64 (1.087) 
0 (3) 
 
CARE 
 
 
0.69 (1.05) 
0 (3) 
 
0.97 (1.228) 
0 (3) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below as non-parametric tests were run. 
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Wish Fulfilment 
High ICCs were calculated for the practice dreams, ICC = .81; and the study dreams, ICC = 
.94. Table 3 shows that the UWD patients’ dreams had a higher mean wish-fulfilment score 
than the controls’ dreams did.  In line with this study’s hypothesis that the UWD patients’ 
dream reports would show a higher degree of wish fulfilment, this difference was significant, 
U = 511, p = .009, r = .26.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Wish Fulfilment 
 
Measure 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Wish fulfilment 
 
1.78 (1.03) 
2 (3) 
 
1.16 (1.09) 
0.83 (3) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below as a non-parametric test was run. 
 
Nightmares 
Inter-rater reliability scores of 100% and 88% were achieved for the practice dreams and 
study dreams respectively, as calculated by Domhoff (1996)’s measure of perfect agreement.  
Table 4 indicates that 11.5% of the UWD patients’ dream reports and 31% of the controls’ 
dream reports were classified as nightmares. Figure 2 provides a graphic indication of these 
differences. 
 
Table 4. Contingency Table: Nightmares 
 
Group 
Nightmare 
No Yes 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
23 (88.5%)  
.8 (1.9) 
 
40 (69%) 
-.5 (-1.9) 
 
3 (11.5%) 
-1.4 (-1.9) 
 
18 (31%) 
.9 (1.9) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Standardized residuals with adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported 
below. 
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A Pearson’s chi-square test demonstrated a significant association between whether a 
dream report came from an UWD patient or from a control participant, and whether the report 
was classified as a nightmare or not, χ2 (1) = 3.64, p = .047, Cramer = .21. Calculating the odds 
ratio revealed that the chance of a control participant’s dream report being a nightmare was 
3.45 times higher than the chance of an UWD patient’s report being a nightmare. Despite 
none of the standardized residuals being significant, the adjusted standardized residuals are 
very close to the significance level of ± 1.96 (see Table 4), suggesting that the observed 
counts are very nearly significantly different to the expected counts.  
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of the dream reports that were coded as nightmares. 
 
‘Nightmares’ Collected from a Subset of the Participants 
Six of the UWD patients, and fourteen controls, had been asked a series of questions 
specifically about nightmares. All six of the UWD patients asked said that they understood 
what a nightmare was, as did fourteen of the sixteen controls. Three of those six UWD 
patients said that they had had a nightmare before (50%) and twelve of the fourteen controls 
(86%) said that they had had a nightmare before. These three UWD patients all actually 
reported a ‘nightmare’ (although one of these ‘nightmares’ was not classified as a nightmare 
when the raters performed the nightmare coding), and so did six of the controls (the other five 
controls were unable to recall a nightmare at the time of the interview, despite saying that 
they had had a nightmare before). Therefore, nine ‘nightmares’ were collected in total (these 
are referred to in inverted commas because the ‘nightmares’ collected in this manner did not 
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necessarily meet the criteria to be classified as nightmares by the raters). A summary of the 
details of these ‘nightmares’ is presented in Table 5. 
When these ‘nightmares’ were removed from the chi-square analysis of nightmare 
frequency, only one of the remaining 23 UWD patients’ dream reports was classified as a 
nightmare, as were 12 of the remaining 52 controls’ dream reports (as depicted in Table 6). 
The chi-square result remained similar, χ2 (1) = 3.90, p = .043, Cramer = .23. However, as the 
expected count for one of the cells is smaller than five (see Table 6), the statistical power of 
the test may have been undermined, which could have resulted in an under-estimation of the 
chi-square statistic. For this reason, Fisher’s exact test statistic has been reported.  
The effect size, as measured by the odds ratio, increased notably. It seems that when 
the participants were simply asked to report a dream (as opposed to some of the participants 
specifically being asked to report a nightmare), the controls were 6.6 times more likely to 
report a nightmare than the UWD participants were. Figure 3 provides a graphic 
representation of this difference. Furthermore, the adjusted residuals increased to above the 
significance level of ±1.96, indicating more definitively that for this test, the observed counts 
are significantly different to the expected counts. An analysis of the standardized residuals 
indicates where the difference lies, namely that fewer UWD patients than expected reported 
nightmares. The hypothesis that fewer of the UWD patients’ dreams than control 
participants’ dreams would be nightmares is therefore supported. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the Specifically Requested ‘Nightmares’  
 
 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Total no. of participants 
 
8 
 
17 
No. asked about nightmares 6 16 
Understood nightmares 
Had (ever) had a nightmare  
6 
3 
14 
12 
Reported a ‘nightmare’ 3 6 
Rated as a nightmare 2 6 
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Table 6. Contingency Table without the Specifically Requested ‘Nightmares’ 
 
Group 
Nightmare 
No Yes 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
22 (95.7%)  
.7 (2.0) 
 
40 (76.9%) 
-.5 (-2.0) 
 
1 (4.3%) 
-1.5 (-2.0) 
 
12 (23.1%) 
1.0 (2.0) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Standardized residuals with adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported 
below. 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of the dream reports that were coded as nightmares when the specially 
requested ‘nightmares’ were removed. 
 
Bizarreness 
Given that this scale was coded by consensus, no measure of inter-rater reliability was 
calculated. A contingency table revealed very similar percentages of bizarre and non-bizarre 
elements across both of the study groups (see Table 7). A chi-square test produced a non-
significant result.  
When the bizarre elements were broken down into the different types of bizarreness, 
the frequencies of the different types of bizarreness were again quite similar across both 
groups (see Table 8). It is interesting to note though, that the standardised and adjusted 
standardised residuals for the incongruous elements were considerably larger than any of the 
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other residuals. Specifically, they seem to indicate that if there is any difference between the 
observed frequencies and the expected frequencies, that difference could be that there are 
fewer incongruous elements in the UWD patient dream reports than might be expected. 
However, the residuals (at -1.5 and -1.7) do not cross the -1.96 threshold of significance, and 
a chi-square test of contingency once again produced a non-significant result. 
 
Table 7. Contingency Table: Bizarreness 
 
Group 
Type of element 
Bizarre Non-bizarre 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
58 (10.9%) 
-.3 (-.4) 
 
180 (11.5%) 
.2 (.4) 
 
475 (89.1%) 
.1 (.4) 
 
1388 (88.5%) 
-.1 (-.4) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Standardized residuals with adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported 
below. 
 
Table 8. Contingency Table: Different Types of Bizarre Elements 
 
Group 
Type of bizarre element 
Incongruous Vague Discontinuous 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
21 (3.9%) 
-1.5 (-1.7) 
 
94 (5.9%) 
.8 (1.7) 
 
22 (4.1%) 
.1 (.2) 
 
63 (4.0%) 
-.1 (-.2) 
 
16 (3%) 
.0 (.1) 
 
47 (3%) 
.0 (-.1) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Percentages reflect percent of total within-group dream elements. Standardized residuals with 
adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported below. 
 
The incongruous elements can be further broken down into three different types 
(distorted, exotic and impossible). Table 9 indicates that the percentage of distorted elements 
across the two groups was again quite similar, and the percentage of exotic elements was in 
fact exactly the same. The only real difference seems to be between the percentage of 
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impossible elements, and the adjusted standardised residual of 1.9 is very close to significant, 
suggesting that the percentage of impossible elements in a dream report may be contingent on 
whether the dreamer is an UWD patient or not. The odds ratio revealed that a dream element 
in a control participant’s dream report was 2.41 times more likely to be impossible than a 
dream element in an UWD patient’s dream report. Furthermore, when only the bizarre 
elements were taken into account, the odds ratio showed that a bizarre element in a control 
participant’s dream report was 2.56 times more likely to be impossible than a bizarre element 
in an UWD patient’s dream report. However, the over-all chi-square test still produced an 
insignificant result. 
 
Table 9. Contingency Table: Different Types of Incongruous Elements 
 
Group 
Type of incongruous element 
Distorted Exotic Impossible 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
11 (2.1%) 
-.8 (-.9) 
 
44 (2.8%) 
.4 (.9) 
 
5 (0.9%) 
.0 (.0) 
 
15 (0.9%) 
.0 (.0) 
 
5 (0.9%) 
-1.6 (-1.9) 
 
35 (5.9%) 
.9 (1.9) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Percentages reflect percent of total within-group dream elements. Standardized residuals with 
adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported below. 
 
Word Count 
Excellent ICCs of ICC = .91, and ICC = .96, were calculated for the practice and study 
dreams respectively. The word count scores were not normally distributed, and there was 
strong evidence of heteroscedasticity, F(1,82) = 12.04, p = .001. However, a log 
transformation was able to satisfactorily address both problems. A t-test on the transformed 
data indicated that the average word count of the UWD patients’ dream reports (see Table 10) 
was significantly lower than that of the controls’ dream reports, and the effect size was 
moderate, t(82) = -3.28, p = .001, r = -.34. This is in line with this study’s hypothesis to this 
effect. When the ‘nightmares’ (which tended to be shorter reports) were omitted from the 
analysis, the difference between the average word count of the UWD patients’ dream reports 
and the average count of the controls’ dream reports increased, as is reflected by the smaller p 
value and larger effect size t(73) = -3.58, p < .001, r = -.39. 
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics: Word Count 
 
Data 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Raw scores 
Without nightmares 
Log transformed  
Log transformed without nightmares 
 
83.00 (63.67) 
86.54 (66.16) 
1.77 (0.39) 
1.79 (0.40) 
 
175.59 (151.82) 
189.75 (153.74) 
2.08 (0.40) 
2.13 (0.38) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Happy Memories Word Count 
The ICC calculated for the happy memories did not meet this study’s inter-rater reliability 
criteria, ICC = .76. Therefore, those happy memories which showed the greatest word count 
difference between raters were recoded by consensus. Although the data collected deviated 
significantly from the assumption of normality, it appeared to be homoscedastic, and 
therefore a Mann-Whitney U test is reported. The average word count for the UWD patients’ 
happy memories was less than the average word count for the controls’ happy memories (see 
Table 11); but despite the moderate effect size, this difference was not significant, U = 16, z = 
-1.39, p = .095, r = -.36. However, the non-significant p value should be interpreted with 
caution, as it could be a product of the small sample size as opposed to a true indication that 
there was no difference between the length of the UWD patients’ and the control participants’ 
dream reports. The moderately strong effect size also suggests that UWD does in fact have an 
impact on the length of the happy memories. 
 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics: Happy Memories Word Count 
 
Measure 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Word count 
 
36.90 (16.86) 
34.33 (49.67) 
 
115.75 (130.13) 
77.83 (387.33) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below given that a non-parametric test was run. 
 
 
 
42 
Narrative Item Count 
High ICCs of ICC = .87, and ICC = .95 were calculated for the practice and study dreams, 
respectively. Once again, the data was not normally distributed, and there was strong 
evidence of heteroscedasticity, F(1,82) = 10.01, p = .002. A logarithmic transformation was 
used to solve the problems of non-normality and heteroscedasticity. A t-test on the 
transformed data indicated that the average narrative count of the UWD patients’ dream 
reports (see Table 12) was significantly lower than the average narrative count of the 
controls’ dream reports, and the effect size was moderate, t(82) = -2.35, p = .011, r = -.25. 
Once again, this finding is in line with the corresponding hypothesis made by this study. 
Again, omitting the ‘nightmares’ from the analysis led to an increase in the difference 
between the average narrative count of the UWD patients’ dream reports and the average 
count of the controls’ dream reports, t(73) = -2.60, p = .006, r = -.29. 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics: Narrative Count 
 
Data  
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Raw scores 
Without nightmares 
Log transformed  
Log transformed without nightmares 
 
43.65 (26.68) 
45.65 (27.36) 
1.55 (0.31) 
1.57 (0.31) 
 
73.43 (57.83) 
78.99 (58.41) 
1.74 (0.35) 
1.78 (0.33) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Happy Memories Narrative Item Count 
The happy memories’ ICC score was only moderately strong, ICC = .66. Once again, those 
happy memories on which the raters had disagreed most severely were recoded by consensus. 
This data showed evidence of non-normality, as well as heteroscedasticity, F(1,13) = 6.31, p 
= .026. In this instance, the problem seemed to be best corrected by a reciprocal 
transformation. As with the word count, the mean narrative count for the UWD patients’ 
happy memories was lower than the mean narrative count for the controls’ happy memories 
(see Table 13). The effect size was moderate, although the difference was not significant, 
t(13) = 1.46, p = .084, r = -.38. Once again, this non-significant result should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample size, especially in light of the moderate effect size. 
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Table 13. Descriptive Statistics: Happy Memories Narrative Count 
 
Data 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
Raw scores 
Reciprocally transformed 
 
22.76 (9.95) 
0.05 (0.02) 
 
66.79 (72.91) 
0.03 (0.03) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Threat 
For the threat and escape measure as a whole, perfect agreement of 91% and 82% were 
calculated for the practice dreams and study dreams respectively. A slightly higher 
percentage of the UWD patients’ dream reports contained a significant physical threat to the 
dreamer (34.6%) relative to the controls’ dream reports (27.6% - see Table 14). However, a 
chi-square test revealed that the incidence of threat in the dream reports was not significantly 
contingent on whether the dreamer was an UWD patient or not, χ2 (1) = .42, p = .343, Cramer 
= .07. The odds ratio showed that an UWD patients’ dream report was 1.39 times more likely 
to contain a significant physical threat than a control participants’ dream report. This 
contradicts the hypothesis that fewer of the UWD patients’ dream reports would contain a 
significant threat to the dreamer than the controls’ dream reports. 
 
Table 14. Contingency Table: Dream Reports Containing Threats 
 
Group 
Did the dream report contain a threat? 
No Yes 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
17 (65.4%) 
-.3 (-.7) 
 
42 (72.4%) 
.2 (.7) 
 
9 (34.6%) 
.5 (.7) 
 
16 (27.6%) 
-.3 (-.7) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Standardized residuals with adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported 
below. 
 
It should be noted that in the subsequent analyses of whether the threat was life-
threatening or not, whether the threat was ancestral or modern, whether the dreamer was able 
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to escape that threat or not, and whether that escape was realistic, each contingency table 
contained at least one cell with an expected count of less than five. The likelihood of coming 
to a false negative conclusion may therefore have been increased, and for this reason Fisher’s 
exact test statistic has been reported.  
In total, 22.2% of the threats experienced by the UWD patients were coded as life-
threatening, compared to 75% of the threats experienced by the controls (see Table 15). A 
chi-square test yielded a significant result, suggesting that there was a significant relationship 
between whether a dreamer was an UWD patient or not, and whether the threat that they 
experienced in their dream was life-threatening, χ2 (1) = 6.51, p = .016, Cramer = .51. 
Examining the odds ratio revealed that a threat in a control participants’ dream report was 
10.5 times more likely to be life-threatening than a threat in an UWD patient dream report.  
The vast majority of the threats experienced by both the UWD patients and the 
controls were ancestral as opposed to modern (88.9% for the UWD patients and 93.8% for 
the controls). A chi-square test produced a non-significant result. 
 
Table 15. Contingency Table: Life-threatening vs. Non-life-threatening Threats 
 
Group 
Life-threatening 
No Yes 
 
UWD 
 
 
Control 
 
 
7 (77.8%)  
1.5 (2.6) 
 
4 (25.0%) 
-1.1 (-2.6) 
 
2 (22.2%) 
-1.4 (-2.6) 
 
12 (75.0%) 
1.0 (2.6) 
Note. Group frequencies are reported with group (row) percentages in parentheses. 
Standardized residuals with adjusted standardized residuals in parentheses are reported 
below. 
 
The percentage of UWD patients who were able to escape the threat in their dream 
reports (66.7%) was higher than that of the control participants (43.8%). However, a chi-
square test revealed no significant relationship between whether the dreamer belonged to the 
patient group or the control group, and whether they were able to escape a threat in their 
dreams, χ2 (1) = 1.21, p = .248, Cramer = .22. The odds ratio showed that UWD patients were 
2.58 times more likely than control participants to escape the threat in their dreams, 
contradicting the hypothesis that UWD patients would be less likely to escape the threats in 
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their dream reports than control participants. 33.3% of the UWD patients’ escapes were 
realistic, as were 57.1% of the controls’ escapes. A chi-square test once again produced a 
non-significant result. 
In total, two of the 26 dream reports from UWD patients (7.7%), and four of the 58 
dream reports from control participants (6.9%), contained a realistic physical threat to the 
dreamer and a subsequent realistic escape. 
The difference in the instance of threat in the UWD patients’ dream reports and the 
controls’ dream reports diminished when the specifically requested ‘nightmare’ reports were 
removed. Six of the remaining 23 UWD patient dream reports contained a threat (26.1%), as 
did eleven of the remaining 52 control dream reports (21.2%). It is also interesting to note 
that three of the six remaining UWD dream reports containing threat came from participant 
number 30; in other words, all of the dream reports collected from this participant contained a 
significant physical threat. 
 
Approach versus Avoidance Behaviour 
The percentage of perfect agreement was calculated at 87% and 85% for the practice dreams 
and study dreams respectively. Both the UWD patients and the control participants showed 
considerably higher levels of approach behaviour versus avoidance behaviour in their dreams, 
and these rates were very similar across the two groups: 76.9% of UWD patients’ dream 
reports, and 74.1% of controls’ dream reports, were coded as involving predominantly 
approach behaviour. When the specifically requested ‘nightmares’ were removed from the 
analysis, the percentage of dreams that exhibited predominantly approach behaviour 
increased slightly across both groups: to 83.3% of the UWD patients’ dream reports, and 
80.8% of the controls’ dream reports. Chi square analyses confirmed that there was no 
significant relationship between whether a dream came from an UWD patient or not and 
whether that dream constituted mostly approach or avoidance behaviour, contradicting the 
hypothesis that fewer of the UWD patients’ dream reports would contain avoidance 
behaviour than control participants’ dream reports. 
 
Factor Analysis 
The original principal components analysis was conducted on 16 variables, namely: positive 
affect; negative affect; six of Panksepp’s basic emotions (LUST was omitted as a score of 0 
was recorded for every dream); wish fulfilment; nightmares; threat; approach versus 
avoidance behaviour; the total number of non-bizarre elements; the total number of bizarre 
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elements; the narrative item count; and the word count. However, the solution was found to 
be more stable when RAGE, GRIEF and CARE were also excluded from the analysis. This 
was due to these variables explaining very little variance, having low correlations with the 
other variables, and therefore also relating poorly to the primary components extracted by the 
analysis. In addition, these variables scored poorly on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy. This was especially true for RAGE, which had KMO = .44, 
which is below the acceptable threshold of .5 (Field, 2009). 
When these three variables were removed, the KMO score for the analysis as a whole 
was good, KMO = .74. The individual KMO scores were all greater than >.59. Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was significant, χ2 (78) = 945.64, p < .001, indicating that the correlations 
between the variables were sufficiently large for principal components analysis. 
The correlation matrix for the remaining 13 variables, as well as for the ‘bizarreness 
ratio’ (a variable reflecting the percentage of the total bizarre and non-bizarre elements which 
were bizarre), is provided in Table 16. A number of very strong correlations are immediately 
apparent.  
A principal components analysis with an oblique rotation (oblimin) on the 13 
variables revealed a three-factor solution. This solution was based on Kaiser’s criterion (all 
three factors had eigenvalues greater than one), as well as on the analysis of the scree plot 
(the point of inflection fell at the fourth component, indicating that the first three components 
should be retained). Together, these three components explained 74% of the variance. The 
loadings of each variable on the three components after rotation are reflected in the pattern 
matrix (see Table 17). The correlations between each variable and the three components are 
reflected in the structure matrix (see Table 18). 
The clustering of the variables suggests that the first component constitutes an 
‘Unpleasantness’ component, given that positive affect, PLAY, and wish fulfilment all have 
large negative loadings on this component, and the negative affect and nightmare variables 
load onto the component positively (see Table 17). The structure matrix reveals that FEAR 
also has a strong positive correlation with this component (see Table 18). 
The second component seems chiefly to be a ‘Length of the dream report’ component, 
as word count, narrative count, and the number of non-bizarre elements load the most 
strongly onto this component, and each of these variables is chiefly a measure of how long 
the dream report is.  
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Table 16. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables 
Variables 
Pos. 
affect 
Neg. 
affect 
PLAY FEAR SEEK 
ING 
Wish 
fulfil. 
Night 
mare 
 
Positive affect  
 
Negative affect 
 
PLAY 
 
FEAR 
 
SEEKING 
 
Wish fulfilment 
 
Nightmare 
 
Threat 
 
Approach vs avoid. 
 
Non-bizarre elements 
 
Bizarre elements 
 
Word count 
 
Narrative count 
 
Bizarreness ratio 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.341 
 
.377 
 
-.115 
 
-.128 
 
-.135 
 
-.137 
 
-.186 
 
-.659* 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.462 
 
-.437 
 
.398 
 
.249 
 
.357 
 
.407 
 
.027 
 
.882* 
 
-.638* 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.370 
 
.363 
 
-.148 
 
-.122 
 
-.149 
 
-.138 
 
-.145 
 
-.524* 
 
.729* 
 
-.461 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.645* 
 
-.451 
 
.254 
 
.143 
 
.196 
 
.223 
 
.037 
 
-.267 
 
.442 
 
-.245 
 
.341 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
.097 
 
-.109 
 
.610* 
 
.342 
 
.503* 
 
.541* 
 
-.072 
 
.910* 
 
-.653* 
 
.749* 
 
-.514* 
 
-.241 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
-.281 
 
.303 
 
-.098 
 
-.162 
 
-.112 
 
-.099 
 
-.224 
 
-.509* 
 
.574* 
 
-.363 
 
.640* 
 
.182 
 
-.612* 
 
1.00 
 
.286 
 
-.302 
 
.140 
 
.136 
 
.119 
 
.087 
 
.102 
Note. Correlations ≥ .5 are indicated by * and presented in bold. 
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Table 16. continued 
 
Variables 
Variables 
Threat App. 
avoid 
Non-
bizarre 
Bizarre Word 
count 
Narr. 
count 
Bizarre 
ratio 
 
Threat 
 
Approach vs. avoid. 
 
Non-bizarre elements 
 
Bizarre elements 
 
Word count 
 
Narrative count 
 
Bizarreness ratio 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
-.707* 
 
1.00 
 
.145 
 
.045 
 
1.00 
 
.022 
 
-.049 
 
.330 
 
1.00 
 
.087 
 
.080 
 
.880* 
 
.386 
 
1.00 
 
.078 
 
.059 
 
.907* 
 
.360 
 
.916* 
 
1.00 
 
.065 
 
-.135 
 
-.319 
 
.619* 
 
-.186 
 
-.235 
 
1.00 
Note. Correlations ≥ .5 are indicated by * and presented in bold. 
 
In addition, none of the variables load negatively onto the second component (see 
Table 17), although the correlations between positive affect, PLAY, wish fulfilment, and this 
length component are negative, though not very large (see Table 18). This strengthens the 
hypothesis that the second component is a ‘Length’ component, as it suggests that the count 
or intensity of most of the variables increases as the dream report gets longer (with the 
exception of positive affect PLAY, and wish fulfilment). 
The third component can be viewed as a ‘Danger’ component. Both FEAR and threat 
have large positive loadings on this component, and approach versus avoidance behaviour 
has a strong negative loading on the component (given that avoidance behaviour was scored 
as 0, and approach behaviour as 1, this means that the higher a participant’s score on the 
‘Danger’ component, the more likely that her dream was to be classified as demonstrating 
chiefly avoidance behaviour versus being classified as demonstrating chiefly approach 
behaviour).  
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Table 17. Pattern Matrix 
 
Variable 
Component 
Unpleasantness Length Danger 
 
Positive affect  
 
Negative affect 
 
PLAY 
 
FEAR 
 
SEEKING 
 
Wish fulfilment 
 
Nightmare 
 
Threat 
 
Approach vs. avoidance 
 
Non-bizarre elements 
 
Bizarre elements 
 
Word count 
 
Narrative count 
 
-.975* 
 
.548* 
 
-.866* 
 
.326 
 
.128 
 
-.996* 
 
.580* 
 
-.083 
 
-.028 
 
-.129 
 
.111 
 
-.085 
 
-.103 
 
.033 
 
.324 
 
.004 
 
.170 
 
.674* 
 
.048 
 
.022 
 
.023 
 
.140 
 
.966* 
 
.489 
 
.952* 
 
.969* 
 
.033 
 
.328 
 
-.006 
 
.609* 
 
.039 
 
.092 
 
.203 
 
.954* 
 
-.854* 
 
.060 
 
-.085 
 
-.030 
 
-.005 
Note. Factor loadings ≥ .5 are indicated by * and presented in bold 
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Table 18. Structure Matrix 
 
Variable 
Component 
Unpleasantness Length Danger 
 
Positive affect 
 
Negative affect 
 
PLAY 
 
FEAR 
 
SEEKING 
 
Wish fulfilment 
 
Nightmare 
 
Threat 
 
Approach vs. avoidance 
 
Non-bizarre elements 
 
Bizarre elements 
 
Word count 
 
Narrative count 
 
-.953* 
 
.773* 
 
-.866* 
 
.635* 
 
.315 
 
-.944* 
 
.675* 
 
.340 
 
-.366 
 
.141 
 
.197 
 
.142 
 
.139 
 
-.209 
 
.501* 
 
-.215 
 
.325 
 
.711* 
 
-.192 
 
.193 
 
.116 
 
.032 
 
.941* 
 
.507* 
 
.927* 
 
.942* 
 
-.390 
 
.606* 
 
-.384 
 
.771 
 
.175 
 
-.338 
 
.460 
 
.921* 
 
-.851* 
 
.119 
 
.022 
 
.046 
 
.066 
Note. Correlations ≥ .5 are indicated by * and presented in bold. 
 
It is interesting to note that the total number of bizarre elements does not load very 
strongly onto any of these components (its strongest loading is on the ‘Length’ component). 
It could be argued that the percentage of elements in a dream that are bizarre is a better 
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measure of how bizarre a dream is than the total number of bizarre elements. Interestingly, 
when the variable ‘bizarreness ratio’ was added to the factor analysis, a fourth component 
emerged. Only two variables had loadings greater than .1 on this component, namely the total 
number of bizarre elements (with a factor loading of .871) and bizarreness ratio (with a factor 
loading of .913). This suggests that this fourth component is a ‘bizarreness’ component. 
 
The ‘Unpleasantness’ Component 
The control participants had a higher mean score on the ‘unpleasantness’ component than the 
UWD participants (see Table 19).  A one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test revealed that this 
difference was significant, U = 478, p = .004, r = -.29.  
 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics: ‘Unpleasantness’ 
 
Component 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
‘Unpleasantness’ 
 
-.40 (.97) 
-.34 (3.18) 
 
.18 (.97) 
.52 (3.19) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below given that a non-parametric test was run. 
 
The ‘Length’ Component 
The control participants had a higher mean score on the ‘length’ component than the UWD 
participants (see Table 20).  However, before further analysis took place, the data was 
inversely transformed in order to correct for severe heteroscedasticity. The subsequent one-
tailed Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the difference between the groups was significant, 
U = 555, p = .027, r = -.21.   
 
The ‘Danger’ Component  
The UWD patients had a higher mean score on the ‘danger’ component than the control 
group (see Table 21). However, a one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test returned a non-significant 
result, U = 672, p = .216, r = .09.  
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics: ‘Length’ 
 
Component 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
‘Length’ 
 
 
Inversely transformed 
‘length’ 
 
-.39 (.58) 
-.42 (2.22) 
 
-1.91 (4.91) 
-1.35 (24.13) 
 
.18 (1.10) 
-.08 (4.30) 
 
9.53 (87.85) 
-.94 (741.81) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below given that a non-parametric test was run. 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics: ‘Danger’ 
 
Component 
Group 
UWD patients Controls 
 
‘Danger’ 
 
.03 (.99) 
-.55 (.97) 
 
-.01 (1.01) 
-.42 (3.03) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians with range in 
parentheses are reported below given that a non-parametric test was run. 
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CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION 
This study examined the difference between UWD patients’ and control participants’ 
scores on measures of various dream characteristics in order to investigate the role the 
basolateral amygdala plays in dreaming. Taken together, the results of these measures begin 
to characterise the dreams of Urbach-Wiethe Disease patients as being generally more 
pleasant, less unpleasant, more wish fulfilling, less likely to be nightmares, simpler and 
shorter than the dreams of control participants. Due to the very high inter-rater reliability 
scores for all the individually coded measures (with the exception of the happy memory 
counts), these results can be interpreted with considerable confidence. 
This discussion will begin with a brief account of each of the individual results, 
before turning to how these findings might impact on some influential dream theories. As set 
out in the literature review, Solms (2000) does not place a great emphasis on the amygdala’s 
role in dreaming, suggesting that the dopaminergic pathways of the SEEKING system 
constitute the critical structures. In contrast, Hobson et al. (2000) and Levin et al. (2010) 
suggest that the amygdala is central to the dreaming process, while Revonsuo (2000) 
contends that the very purpose of dreaming is the priming of the fear conditioning system that 
centres on the amygdala.  
 
The Preservation of Dreaming and Dream Memory in UWD Patients 
Firstly, confirming Wiest and Brainin’s (2010) findings, this research proves that patients 
without functioning basolateral amygdalae are able to dream, and to remember their dreams. 
Therefore, despite high levels of activation during REM, and somewhat contrary to the ideas 
put forth by some theorists, the basolateral amygdala does not seem to be an indispensable 
structure in the production of dreams. The UWD patients were able to recall a dream on 
every occasion that they asked for a dream report. They did not struggle to recall a dream any 
more than the control participants did. This indicates that the basolateral amygdala is not 
critical to successful dream recall, although it may be involved in the process.  
Unfortunately, this study was not completely able to separate the effects of bilateral 
basolateral amygdala damage on dreaming from the possible effects of bilateral basolateral 
amygdala damage on dream recall. For example, it is possible that basolateral amygdala 
damage leads to a bias in the types of dream experiences that are recalled, or reduces the 
extent to which dreams are accurately recalled. The latter possibility may be reflected by the 
finding that UWD patients’ dream reports were significantly shorter than the controls’ dream 
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reports (see the discussion of word count results), although it is important to bear in mind that 
the UWD patients did not appear to struggle especially with dream recall. 
Given that any attempt to examine an individual’s subjective dream experiences 
inevitably relies on the individual’s recall of the dream, this is not an easy problem to 
circumvent. However, this problem might be reduced if the dream reports were collected in a 
sleep laboratory. This possibility is discussed in more depth in the ‘Directions for future 
research’ section. 
 
Intensity of Positive and Negative Affect 
Given that amygdala damage has repeatedly been linked to the impairment of negative affect 
(especially fear and anger) in waking life (e.g. Adolphs et al., 1994; LeDoux, 2003), the idea 
that amygdala damage might lead to impaired fear, anger, and negative affect in dreaming is 
perhaps the most relevant and defensible hypothesis examined by this study. Indeed, several 
dream theories have proposed a central role for the amygdala in the generation of negative 
emotion (and particularly fear) in dreaming (Domhoff, 2001; Hobson et al., 2000; Revonsuo, 
2000). 
The intensity of negative affect was found to be significantly lower among the UWD 
patients’ dream reports than it was among the control participants’ dream reports (p = .037), 
although the effect size was relatively small (r = -.20). This result provides the first concrete 
support for the common hypothesis that amygdala damage should lead to reduced negative 
affect in dreams.  
The intensity of positive affect was found to be higher among the UWD patients’ 
dream reports than it was among the control participants’ dream reports. This difference was 
highly significant (p = .003) and the moderate effect size (r = .32) was one of the largest 
effect sizes returned by this study. However, finding significant results of any effect size (and 
this study was able to uncover a number of significant results) is a substantial discovery if 
one considers the numerous challenges faced in dream research in general, and in this study 
in particular. 
In terms of previous speculation regarding the likely effects of amygdala damage on 
dream affect, the central hypothesis suggested by a number of dream theorists, as well as by 
most previous research, is that amygdala damage could lead to reduced negative affect in 
dreams (Domhoff, 2001; Hobson et al., 2000; Revonsuo, 2000) and possibly also to reduced 
affect in general (Wiest and Brainin, 2010). It is therefore quite interesting to find that UWD 
patients in fact seemed to exhibit increased positive affect. However, this finding is consistent 
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with research that has suggested that UWD patients might also express predominantly 
positive emotions in their waking life (Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 1998), as well as 
Domhoff’s (2001) prediction that amygdala damage would lead to dreams with a higher 
proportion of positive to negative emotion than is the norm. 
 
Panksepp’s Basic Emotions 
The variable of PLAY had a significantly higher mean intensity among the UWD patients’ 
dream reports than it had among the controls’ dream reports (p = .046), although the effect 
size was small (r = .19). There were no instances of RAGE whatsoever among the UWD 
patients’ dream reports, which was significantly different to the controls’ dream reports (p = 
.019). This effect was slightly stronger (r = -.24). These findings echo the significantly higher 
intensity of positive affect and the significantly lower intensity of negative affect among the 
UWD patients’ dream reports.  
The absence of RAGE in the UWD patients’ dream reports is in line with a number of 
studies that have implicated the amygdala in the recognition of stimuli expressing anger (e.g. 
Scott et al., 1997). However, such studies have focussed almost exclusively on the 
recognition of anger in external stimuli, and there is little existing evidence linking the 
amygdala to the internal experience of anger (Damasio et al., 2000; Denson, Pederson, 
Ronquillo & Nandy, 2009), although Panksepp (2014) does suggest that the structure is 
involved in the RAGE system.  
For each of the remaining basic emotions, with the exception of LUST, which was not 
observed in any of the dream reports, the mean intensity level was slightly higher for the 
control participants than it was for the UWD patients, although none of these differences 
were significant.  
The absence of LUST from all the dream reports is interesting, but not entirely 
surprising when one considers the demographics of the sample. The UWD patients (and 
consequently the matched controls) live in conservative, religious communities, and would 
probably feel uncomfortable speaking about subjects that contain erotic content. The 
participants’ Christian beliefs come across very strongly in their dream reports, as many of 
them interpreted their dreams as being messages from God, Jesus or deceased relatives.  
It is also interesting, considering the large body of research linking the amygdala to 
various types of fear processing (see the ‘Amygdala’s Waking Function’ section), that there 
was no significant difference between the two groups in terms of their level of FEAR. 
Qualitatively, it appears that though there were initially similar levels of threatening 
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situations and appropriate FEAR responses among the two groups’ dream reports; the 
threatening situation was more frequently resolved in the UWD patients’ dream reports than 
it was in the control dream reports. This is, again, consistent with the finding that the UWD 
patients’ dream reports were more positive over-all.   
 
Wish Fulfilment 
The UWD patients’ dream reports had a significantly higher mean wish fulfilment score than 
the control participants’ dream reports. This effect was highly significant (p = .009) and 
moderately strong (r = .26). This result is once again in keeping with the pattern of UWD 
patients’ dream reports being generally more positive than the controls’ dream reports.  
From a qualitative standpoint, the wish fulfilling nature of the UWD patients’ dream 
reports was also very clearly observable. A number of their dream reports were short, simple, 
very clearly wish-fulfilling dreams of a type not observed among the control groups’ dream 
reports. Indeed, the decision to investigate wish fulfilment was made chiefly on the basis of 
this qualitative observation that the UWD patients’ dream reports seemed to frequently 
consist of simple wish fulfilment dreams of the type conceptualised by Freud (1900/1954).   
For example, one typical dream report from an UWD patient ran as follows: “I dreamt that 
my unemployed husband got work, and I became very happy that he found work. The work 
was close to our home here in Kleinzee, and the work that he did was at the plant”. Or, 
another report: “I dreamt that I was sitting under a tree and when I looked up there was fruit 
hanging in the tree. Big pears and apples and one specific fruit that I wanted to pick was so 
beautifully ripe. Then I picked it. That fruit that I picked made me feel very happy”. Finally, 
a third example: “I dreamt that my [disabled] daughter was walking. I often dream that she’s 
walking. God shows me exactly how my child walk”.   
Not all of the UWD patients’ dream reports were so entirely wish fulfilling; however, 
as mentioned above, and evident in the dream report example provided in the ‘Nightmares’ 
section below, many of their dream reports that did contain negative or threatening aspects 
also contained some element of resolution or wish fulfilment. The 0-3 scale used to assess the 
extent to which each dream constituted the fulfilment of a wish (see APPENDIX C) was also 
sensitive to picking up wish-fulfilling elements in these not-entirely wish fulfilling dreams. 
These elements would therefore also have contributed to the overall higher mean wish 
fulfilment score observed among the UWD patients. 
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Nightmares 
This study’s results clearly indicate that it is possible for patients with bilateral basolateral 
amygdala lesions to experience nightmares; however, it seems that these nightmares are rare. 
Six of the UWD patients were asked if they understood what a nightmare was and whether 
they had ever had one. Although all six reported that they understood the concept of a 
nightmare, three of them (50%) said that they had never experienced a nightmare before. Of 
the sixteen controls who were asked the same questions, fourteen understood the concept of a 
nightmare and only two of the fourteen (14%) said that they had never experienced a 
nightmare before. Unfortunately, these numbers are not large enough to accurately detect 
whether or not the UWD patients were statistically more likely to never have had a nightmare 
than the control participants were, though it does seem as though this might be the case. 
What is clear is that the UWD patients’ dream reports were significantly less likely to 
be nightmares than the control participants’ dream reports were. Specifically, the controls’ 
dream reports had a 3.5 times greater chance of being classified as nightmares than the 
patients’ dream reports. Furthermore, when none of the participants’ were specifically asked 
to recall a nightmare, the controls’ dream reports had a 6.6 times greater chance of being 
classified as nightmares than the patients’ dream reports. This finding is consistent with 
research linking the over activation of the limbic system in patients with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) to the elevated prevalence and severity of nightmares experienced by such 
patients (Levin et al., 2010). Various dream theorists have also speculated that the amygdala 
is involved in the generation of nightmares, and particularly in the experience of fear in 
nightmares (Domhoff, 2001; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; Revonsuo, 2000). 
It is therefore interesting that, although UWD patients did have significantly fewer 
nightmares, there appear to be comparative levels of FEAR intensity between the UWD 
patients’ dream reports and the control participants’ reports. This fits with the qualitative 
observation that, although there can be negative and scary aspects to the UWD patients’ 
dreams, these negative aspects might not affect the UWD patients as severely as they affect 
the control participants, and these scary or negative aspects are more often resolved. For 
example, one of the patients dreamt that she was lost in a big city among crowds of people, 
feeling stressed and a bit frightened – until her brother came up to her and told her she had 
taken a wrong turn, and showed her which way to go. This left her feeling happy and excited.  
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Bizarreness 
The overall proportion of bizarre dream elements relative to non-bizarre dream 
elements was similar across the two experimental groups (10.9% of all the elements 
identified in the UWD patients’ dream reports were coded as being bizarre, as were 11.5% of 
the elements identified in the controls’ dream reports). The measure used, namely Revonsuo 
and Salmivalli’s (1995) method for content analysis of bizarre elements in dreams, 
categorised bizarre dream elements into three major types. For two of the three major 
bizarreness types (‘vague’ and ‘discontinuous’) the prevalence was virtually identical across 
the two groups. The only difference was in the third type (‘incongruous), with 3.9% of the 
elements in the UWD patients’ dream reports were coded as incongruous and 5.9% of the 
elements in the controls’ dream reports being coded as incongruous. ‘Vague’ elements were 
dream elements that were indeterminate, unknown, or obscure in a manner that would not 
occur in waking life. ‘Discontinuous’ elements were dream elements that suddenly appeared, 
disappeared, or transformed. And ‘incongruous’ elements were dream elements that would 
have been out of place or impossible in waking life. See APPENDIX C for an exact 
explanation of the coding of bizarre elements. 
The ‘incongruous’ category can be further divided into three subtypes, namely; 
‘distorted’ elements (dream elements of which some feature or characteristic had been 
distorted, e.g., a person in your dream is much smaller than they are in reality); ‘exotic’ 
elements (dream elements which the dreamer is highly unlikely to encounter in reality, but 
which are in principle possible, e.g., you have lunch with the Pope); and ‘impossible’ 
elements (dream elements which are impossible in reality, e.g., your dead cat comes back to 
life). The prevalence of exotic elements was identical among the UWD patients’ and the 
control participants’ dream reports. The prevalence of distorted elements was also similar 
across the two groups, with 2.1% of the UWD patients’ dream elements and 2.8% of the 
control participants’ being coded as distorted. The only substantial difference was between 
the prevalence of impossible elements in the two groups’ dream reports. Here, 5.9% of the 
dream elements in the control participants’ dream reports, but only 0.9% of the dream 
elements in the UWD patients’ reports, were coded as being impossible. Furthermore, the 
adjusted standardised residual of 1.9 approached the significance threshold of 1.96, indicating 
that the number of impossible elements in the UWD patients’ dream reports was very nearly 
significantly fewer than would be expected, based on chance.  
However, the overall chi-square statistic remained non-significant. This finding is not 
surprising considering that these ‘impossible’ elements made up just one minor subtype of 
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Revonsuo and Salmivalli’s (1995) content analysis scheme. The fact that this scheme 
analysed so many other types of bizarreness may have clouded the results somewhat. For 
example, the prevalence of ‘vague’ elements might be a reflection of poor dream memory or 
poor articulation, and not necessarily a reflection of actual dream bizarreness. The UWD 
patients do have difficulties speaking, and many of their dream reports were rather unclear. It 
also remains possible that the bilateral basolateral amygdala damage could impact the UWD 
patients’ dream memory to some extent (see above). Furthermore, many of the control 
participants and the UWD patients were not well educated, and this is likely to have affected 
their vocabulary and possibly their ability to articulate their dream narratives. The prevalence 
of ‘discontinuous’ dream elements may also, to some extent, have been due to unclear 
narration of the dream stories.  
Colace (2010, p. 110) argues that the dream literature has consistently suggested that 
there are two major qualities at the root of bizarreness in dreams, namely; “(a) impossibility, 
and (b) improbability and/or oddness compared to common daily experiences”. Both of these 
qualities would fall under what Revonsuou and Salmivalli (1995) termed ‘incongruous’ 
dream elements. It is possible that there might have been a difference between the levels of 
bizarreness in the UWD patients’ and the control participants’ dream reports if a scale had 
been used that focussed only on these types of bizarreness. 
For example, Colace, Violani and Solano (1993) developed a scale that attempted to 
formalise Freud’s classification of dream bizarreness. This scale classifies dreams as being 
either: (i) sensible, plausible and without strange elements; (ii) sensible and consistent within 
itself, but strange compared to everyday life; or (iii) senseless, inconsistent and bizarre. 
Perhaps, if this (or a similar) scale were to have been applied, it might emerge that, relative to 
the controls’ dream reports, fewer of the UWD patients dream reports would have fallen into 
Colace et al.’s (1993) third category. 
 
Word Count and Narrative Item Count 
The control participants’ dream reports had a significantly higher word count and narrative 
item count than the UWD patients’ dream reports. Both of these measures returned 
impressive, moderately strong effect sizes. The word count result was particularly noteworthy 
(r = -.34, and r = -.39 when the specifically requested ‘nightmares’ - which tended to be 
shorter than the other dream reports - were removed). This suggests that bilateral basolateral 
amygdala damage leads to dreams that are not only significantly shorter than normal, but also 
significantly less complex narratively. The UWD patients’ dream reports contained less 
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meaningful chunks of information and less detail, leading to simple dream narratives. These 
results are in line with De Gennaro et al.’s (2011) finding that increased diffusivity of the left 
amygdala was associated with shorter dream reports.  
However, it is difficult to determine whether the lower word and narrative item count 
are entirely reflective of a quality intrinsic to the UWD patients’ dreams, or whether these 
low counts might also be influenced by possible impaired memory, or a reluctance to speak 
due to their vocal difficulties. In an attempt to address this question, the word and narrative 
item counts of a sample of happy memories were analysed.  
The mean word and narrative item count of the happy memories were both lower for 
the UWD patients than for the control participants. However, this difference was non-
significant for both the word count and the narrative item count. This finding suggests that 
the UWD patients’ shorter and simpler dream reports are not due to a general unwillingness 
to speak or to impaired memory. It would therefore seem that bilateral basolateral amygdala 
damage does in fact have a specific impact on the length and narrative complexity of dream 
reports, as opposed to merely reducing the length of reports in general. Although it could be 
that the UWD patients suffer from memory problems that are specific to their dream recall 
(and not to the recall of other types of narratives), this seems unlikely – especially 
considering that they did not show any especial difficulty in initiating and maintaining dream 
recall (see above). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the patients’ actual dreams 
were in fact shorter and simpler than the control participants’ dreams. 
However, due to the small number of happy memories that were analysed, and the 
extent to which p-values are influenced by sample size (Field, 2009), these non-significant p-
values should be interpreted with great caution. The moderately strong effect sizes suggest 
that these tests might well have returned significant results if more happy memories had been 
collected. Furthermore, the word and narrative item counts for the happy memories had inter-
rater reliability scores below the desired level of .8. Although the levels of inter-rater 
reliability were still reasonable, this also impacts on the confidence with which these findings 
can be interpreted. This reduced level of inter-rater reliability is possibly due to the fact that 
these measures were conducted sometime after the raters first established and practiced this 
particular coding method.  
Of course, even if the UWD patients’ happy memories are shorter and simpler than 
the norm, this does not necessarily mean that the shorter dream reports are only due to a 
reluctance to speak and not also to any intrinsic quality of the patients’ dreams. Further 
investigation is necessary in order to confidently determine whether bilateral basolateral 
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amygdala damage does in fact lead to a decrease in the length and narrative complexity of 
UWD patients’ actual dreams. 
 
Threat 
The results pertaining to threat in the participants’ dreams once again supported the idea that 
the negativity in UWD patients’ dream reports tends to resolve itself. Although the patients’ 
dream reports actually contained a slightly higher incidence of significant physical threat than 
the control participants’ dream reports did, the UWD patients were able to successfully 
escape a higher percentage of threats in their dreams than the control participants were.  
It is also interesting to note that, although the UWD patients experienced slightly 
more threats than the control participants, a significantly greater proportion of the threats 
experienced by the controls were life-threatening than those experienced by the UWD 
patients. Indeed, the odds of a threat in a control participant’s dream report being life-
threatening were 10.5 times higher than the odds in an UWD patient’s dream report. These 
results should be interpreted with some caution due to the relatively small sample size (the 
UWD patients only experienced a total of nine threats in their dream reports and the controls 
had a total of twelve threats). However, the discovery of a significant p value (p = .016) 
despite this small sample, taken together with the strong effect size (Cramer = .51) and the 
high odds ratio, do suggest that there is a real robust effect at work here. The larger amount of 
life-threatening instances among the control participants’ threats seems to echo the idea that 
negative events in the control participants’ dream reports tend to be more intense than the 
negative events in the UWD patients’ dream reports. 
For both the UWD patients and the controls, the vast majority of the threats they 
experienced in their dream reports were what Revonsuo (2000) termed ‘ancestral’ as opposed 
to ‘modern’. Given that all of the threats involving direct physical aggression from another 
person or animal were coded as ancestral, it is not surprising that these threats made up the 
greatest proportion of the threats.  
According to the odds ratio, the UWD patients were 2.57 times more likely than the 
controls to escape the threat in their dreams, although fewer of the UWD patients’ escapes 
were realistic. However, neither of these differences was significant.  
In total, 6.9% of the control participants’ dream reports, and 7.7% of the UWD 
patients’ dream reports, contained both a significant physical threat to the dreamer and a 
subsequent realistic escape. These percentages, while small, are slightly higher than results 
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returned by previous studies, which tend to show that less than 5% of normal dream reports 
contain realistic physical threats and subsequent realistic escapes (Malcolm-Smith & Solms, 
2004; Malcolm-Smith et al., 2008; Zadra et al., 2006).  
 
Approach versus Avoidance Behaviour 
Although the UWD patients’ dream reports showed a slightly greater incidence of approach 
behaviour than the control participants’ dream reports, this difference was not significant. In 
total, 76.9% of the UWD patients’ dream reports were coded as incidences of ‘approach’, as 
were 74.1% of the control participants’ dream reports. These figures are both very similar to 
Malcolm-Smith et al.’s (2012) finding that 74.3% of a South African sample’s dream reports 
were incidences of approach behaviour. This result therefore reinforces the idea that dreams 
generally tend to show more approach behaviour than avoidance behaviour, and it seems that 
bilateral basolateral amygdala damage has little impact on this tendency. 
 
Factor Analysis 
A principal components analysis strongly suggested that there are three major factors that 
underlie the various results, namely: an ‘unpleasantness’ component, a ‘length’ component’, 
and a ‘danger’ component. The fact that the different variables grouped together so 
convincingly onto these three components is indicative of the validity of the various measures 
that were used to assess the dream reports. For example, positive affect scores were positively 
correlated with PLAY and wish fulfilment scores, and negatively correlated with negative 
affect, nightmare, and FEAR scores. As a result, positive affect, PLAY, and wish fulfilment 
all had very strong negative loadings on one component (the ‘unpleasantness component’), 
and negative affect, nightmares, and FEAR all loaded positively on this same component. 
This suggests that these variables were all tapping into the same underlying real-world 
characteristic of the dream reports.  
Comparing the UWD patients’ and the control participants’ scores for these three 
components reinforces three ideas that have become apparent over the course of this study. 
Firstly, it is clear that the dream reports of UWD patients are significantly more pleasant, and 
less unpleasant than the dream reports of control participants, as the UWD patients scored 
significantly lower than the control participants on the ‘unpleasantness’ component. This 
difference was highly significant (p = .004) and the effect was moderately strong (r = -.29). 
Secondly, it is clear that the dream reports of the UWD patients are significantly shorter than 
those of controls, as the UWD patients also scored significantly lower than the control 
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participants on the ‘length’ component (p = .027). This effect was also moderately strong (r = 
-.21). Thirdly, it is clear that the dream reports of UWD patients show similar levels of threat 
and FEAR to the dream reports of the control participants, as the two groups showed no 
significant difference in score on the ‘danger’ component. 
In summary, there is strong converging evidence to suggest that bilateral basolateral 
amygdala damage leads to dreams that are shorter, simpler, more pleasant, less unpleasant, 
more wish fulfilling, and less likely to be nightmares than is the norm. It seems that although 
bad things can, and do, happen in the dreams of patients with bilateral basolateral amygdala 
lesions, these patients’ negative emotional experiences tend to be less intense than those of 
control participants, and the bad things tend to be resolved more frequently than is the norm. 
 
Implications for the Dopaminergic SEEKING Model of Dreaming 
Although this model does not specify a clear role for the basolateral amygdala, some of this 
study’s results do provide support for this model. For example, preserved dreaming in UWD 
patients is in line with Solms’s (2000) argument that the dopaminergic SEEKING system (as 
opposed to a system centring on the amygdala) is the critical system in dream production. In 
addition, the high levels of approach behaviour in both the UWD patients’ and the control 
participants’ dream reports (which are in line with findings by Malcolm-Smith et al., 2012), 
also support the hypothesis that dreams are driven by SEEKING behaviour.  
In light of the evidence provided by the current study, Solms’s (2000) model should 
perhaps now include a role for the basolateral amygdala in certain aspects of dream 
production. 
 
Implications for the AIM Model 
The significantly lower mean intensity of negative emotion in the UWD patients’ dream 
reports supports Hobson et al.’s (2000) idea that the amygdala is involved in the intensity of 
negative emotions in dreams. The fact that the UWD patients’ dream reports showed lower 
intensity levels for each basic emotion (except PLAY) also lends some support to the idea 
that the amygdala could be involved more generally in the production of emotion in dreams. 
However, this idea is contradicted by the significantly higher mean intensity of positive 
emotion in the UWD patients’ dream reports. 
Given that the UWD patients had damage confined to the basolateral nuclei of the 
amygdala bilaterally, this discussion cannot comment on the possible involvement of the 
central nuclei of the amygdala in dreaming processes. However, theories that place huge 
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weight on the importance of the amygdala in dreaming are called into question. Although the 
lower word and narrative item counts observed in the UWD patients’ dream reports are in 
line with Hobson’s (2004) idea that the amygdala is involved in the development of dream 
plots, the structure is clearly not critical to the generation of dream plots. 
 
Implications for the AMPHAC model 
Levin et al.’s (2010) AMPHAC model also places significant emphasis on the amygdala’s 
role in dreaming (the first A in AMPHAC stands for amygdala). On the basis of their 
theories, and those of Hobson et al. (2000), but apparently without the support of any 
empirical evidence, Levin et al. (2010, p. 235) make the rather bold statement that “the 
hippocampus and amygdala are now considered to be integral in basic dream production”. 
However, the present study proves quite clearly that patients without functioning basolateral 
amygdalae are still able to produce dreams that are in many ways comparable to those of 
healthy individuals. It therefore seems that the AMPHAC model (along with the AIM model) 
may place too strong an emphasis on the role of the amygdala in the generation of dream 
plots. The results of the present study do, however, provide some support for the idea that the 
amygdala is involved in the generation of dream plots, as well as for Levin et al.’s (2010) 
idea that the amygdala is involved in the generation of nightmares. 
 
Implications for TST 
Two dream report analyses (namely, the analysis of threat and escape; and the analysis of 
approach versus avoidance behaviour) were included specifically to test three hypotheses 
which were generated based on Revonsuo’s (2000) TST. However, none of these hypotheses 
were supported by this study. Threat simulation theory argues that dreaming constitutes an 
evolutionary adaptive means for the human mind to practice responding to threatening 
situations in safety. Within TST, the amygdala is believed to be crucial to both recalling the 
negatively charged emotional memories on which threatening dreams are supposedly based, 
and also to the subsequent response to the threatening situation in the dream (see the ‘Dream 
Theories and the Amygdala’ section for more detail).  
The analyses of threat in the dream reports revealed no significant difference between 
the prevalence of threat in the UWD patients’ and control participants’ dream reports. In fact, 
the odds of an UWD patients’ dream report containing a significant physical threat to the 
dreamer were slightly higher than the odds of a control participants’ dream report containing 
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such a threat. This finding strongly contradicts the idea that the basolateral amygdala is 
necessary for the initiation of threatening dreams.  
Furthermore, if dreaming constitutes the priming of a fear-conditioning network that 
centres on the amygdala, then this conditioning network should be impaired in patients with 
basolateral amygdala damage. This would then result in an inability to form conditioned fear 
responses and consequently less successful avoidance of dream threats. However, there was 
no significant difference between the UWD patients’ and the control participants’ ability to 
escape the threats in their dream reports, either realistically or unrealistically. The UWD 
patients were in fact more likely to escape the threat in their dreams, though their escapes 
were less likely to be realistic. This finding contradicts TST’s claim that the amygdala is 
responsible for responding to threat in dreams.  
Revonsuo’s theory argues that the amygdala is central to threat-avoidance behaviour 
in dreams, and therefore predicts that threat-avoidance behaviour would be significantly less 
prevalent in the dreams of patients with basolateral amygdala damage. However, the two 
groups did not differ in the prevalence of avoidance behaviour in their dream reports.  
This theory also predicts that threat and escape should form a common theme in 
dreams, yet only a small percentage of the dream reports in this study included a significant 
threat and a subsequent realistic escape. In addition, the vast majority of both the UWD 
patients’ and the control participants’ dream reports were predominantly incidences of 
approach behaviour, as opposed to avoidance behaviour. These findings are in line with those 
of Malcolm-Smith and Solms (2004), Malcolm-Smith et al. (2008), Malcolm-Smith et al. 
(2012), and Zadra et al. (2006). 
The present findings stand in contradiction to those of Valli. Strandholm, Sillanmäki, 
and Revonsuo (2008), who report that threat is over-represented in dreams. Valli et al. (2008) 
reach this conclusion by comparing the incidence of threat in dreams to the incidence of 
threat in waking life. Due to a lack of information regarding threat in the waking life of the 
participants, it was not possible to make a similar comparison in the present study. However, 
the difficult living conditions faced by the participants would predict a high level of threat in 
their daily lives. In summary, these results contribute substantially to a growing body of 
evidence challenging a number of TST’s central assumptions. 
 
Similarities between UWD patients’ and Young Children’s Dreams 
Perhaps the most interesting result of the present study is the unexpected, but very striking 
similarity between the characteristics of the UWD patients’ dreams, and the characteristics of 
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children’s dreams, as described by Freud. Freud (1900/1954) held that the dreams of children 
were perfect demonstrations of his belief that all dreams are essentially wish fulfilling. He 
argued that it was only between five and eight years of age that children begin to develop 
superego functions, which cause them to repress and distort the desires expressed in their 
dreams. In his review of the literature, as well as his own studies, Colace (2010) 
demonstrated that young children’s dreams are generally pleasant, simple, non-bizarre and 
wish-fulfilling.  
A majority of the UWD patients’ dreams fit this picture (see the examples in the 
‘Wish Fulfilment’ discussion). Although these are quite ideal examples, the statistical results 
reveal that this is true of the general picture; it was shown that the UWD patients’ dream 
reports were significantly shorter, simpler, more positive, less negative, and more wish 
fulfilling than the controls’ dream reports. The only exception to this is that the UWD 
patients’ dream reports were not found to be less bizarre than the controls’ reports, but this 
might have been due to our bizarreness measure not accurately assessing the types of 
distortions that are relevant to Freudian dream theory.  
Freud attributed the simple wish-fulfilling nature of children’s’ dreams (or in other 
words, the lack of distortion in children’s dreams) to the lack of a developed superego. In 
order to explain the relationship between the superego and dream distortion, Freud drew 
analogy between dream production and an entrepreneur and a capitalist. The entrepreneur has 
the idea for a business, which Freud likened to the day residue in the conscious mind 
providing the impulse, or the idea, to start a dream. This function is supposedly preserved in 
children. The capital, which fuels and intensifies this dream, supposedly comes from 
unconscious, uncomfortable, infantile wishes which have been suppressed by the superego. 
Children do not yet possess such capital, and therefore their dreams remain simple wish 
fulfilments. 
Therefore, if the dreams of UWD patients are similar to those of young children, then 
this raises the interesting idea that the basolateral amygdala could play a role in the circuits 
that underlie superego functions in the human brain. This idea is not entirely dissimilar to the 
common idea that the basolateral amygdala is involved in fear-conditioning (Adolphs, 2010; 
Killcross et al., 1997; Sierra-Mercado et al., 2010). 
 
The Current Findings in Relation to Recent Research on the Waking Amygdala 
The preserved ability to generate emotions in dreams despite bilateral basolateral amygdala 
damage would be in line with the recent research that suggests that the amygdala is involved 
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in modulating reactions to external affective stimuli, and is not a centre for the internal 
generation of emotion (Adolphs, 2010; Sander et al., 2003). However, bilateral basolateral 
amygdala damage was associated with a decrease in certain emotions (namely negative affect 
and RAGE), and an increase in certain other emotions (namely positive affect and PLAY). 
These findings suggest that the structure does play a role in the internal emotional 
experiences of dreams. 
Nevertheless, the results do still provide some evidence for the idea that the 
basolateral amygdala’s role is chiefly to do with analysing the valence of emotionally 
charged stimuli (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa, 2010; Sander et al., 2003). Such a 
hypothesis would be in line with findings that suggest that, despite normal levels of threat in 
the dream reports, the emotional reactions of UWD patients to these threats are limited (as 
demonstrated by the reduced negative affect and incidence of nightmares in their dream 
reports).  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The dream reports in this study were collected using the Most Recent Dream (MRD) method. 
In short, the MRD method asks participants to recall, in as much detail as possible, the most 
recent dream they can remember having (Avila-White et al., 1999). The MRD method has 
been shown, across cultures and socio-economic groups, to be at least as effective and 
reliable as any other method of dream collection, including dream reports that are collected in 
the laboratory (Domhoff, 2000). However, the amygdala has been repeatedly implicated in 
emotional memory processes (Adolphs, Tranel & Buchanan, 2005; Adolphs, 2010). 
Therefore, it is possible that relying on patients with calcified basolateral amygdalae to 
accurately recall their dreams some days after they have actually dreamt them may lead to 
inaccurate data.  
Perhaps collecting the dream reports in a sleep laboratory setting, where participants 
can be woken from REM and asked to recall their dreams immediately, and/or asked to recall 
their dreams first thing on waking, will result in more veridical reports. This may also give 
participants less time to edit, interpret and/or censor their dreams. During the analysis of the 
dream reports it was at times difficult to separate the participants’ actual dreams from their 
religious (Christian) interpretation of their dreams. Nevertheless, every effort was made to 
present the dream reports to the raters in such a manner as to clarify, to as great an extent as 
possible, what was and was not part of the actual dream. 
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As explained under the in the discussion of the bizarreness results, the bizarreness 
measure that was utilised may have been inappropriate for the needs of this study. Future 
research should examine bizarreness in UWD patients’ dream reports using a more 
appropriate measure, such as the one developed by Colace et al. (1993). 
Throughout this study, the differences between the UWD patients’ dream reports and 
the controls’ dream reports have been attributed to the UWD patients’ bilateral basolateral 
amygdala lesions. It is however possible that certain other differences between the UWD 
patients and the control group may also have played a role in the differences observed in their 
dream reports. In an effort to mitigate this, the groups were rigorously matched on all 
demographic conditions in order to attempt to ensure that the only difference between the two 
groups was that the one group had UWD and the other did not. The only other factors, apart 
from bilateral basolateral amygdala damage, that could realistically be considered to separate 
the two groups are other symptoms and consequences of UWD. Additional neurological or 
psychological diagnoses were ruled out among this sample of UWD patients. However, it 
was not possible to control for the possible effects of a lifelong history of living with the 
vocal and dermatological effects of UWD (and the possible stigma attached to this), as well 
as living with the knowledge that they are not only personally living with an incurable 
genetic condition, but also that this condition runs in their families. All of these factors could 
reasonably be supposed to impact on the patients’ psyches, in various ways that may 
subsequently have some effect on their dreams or on their reporting of their dreams.  
However, without wanting to minimise the possible consequences of living with 
UWD, these are by no means necessarily the most difficult issues with which these particular 
people are confronted. The patients and the controls in this study live in communities where 
poverty and unemployment levels are high, and various other social issues, such as alcohol 
and drug abuse, poor education and HIV/AIDS, are very prevalent. In addition, due to the 
relative prevalence of UWD disease among the families in these small rural communities, the 
stigma attached to the condition is commensurately reduced. 
Furthermore, if symptoms of UWD other than bilateral basolateral amygdala damage 
were affecting the patients’ dreams and causing their dream reports to differ from those of the 
controls, then one might reasonably assume that they would cause the patients’ dream reports 
to be more negative than those of the controls. It would be premature to claim to understand 
exactly what effect these skin and voice problems (and other possible consequences of UWD) 
may have on the psychological wellbeing of the patients; however, from interactions with 
these patients it is clear that the condition is distressing to them. Seeing that this study in fact 
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suggests that the dreams of UWD patients with bilateral basolateral amygdala lesions tend to 
be more positive than those of individuals without UWD, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
this difference is caused chiefly by the patients’ basolateral amygdala damage and not by any 
other aspect of the disease. 
This study introduced the interesting idea that bilateral basolateral amygdala damage 
is associated with simple wish fulfilment dreams of the type typically experienced by young 
children. This led to the hypothesis that the basolateral amygdala may be involved in the 
superego circuits that govern the pervasive unpleasant distortions and complications found in 
the dreams of normal adults. This is (to the best of my knowledge) an entirely new idea, and 
there is a distinct lack of existing investigation into the neural correlates of superego 
functions. It is possible to speculate that a pathway between the basolateral amygdala and the 
orbito-frontal cortex (in which the orbito-frontal cortex has an inhibitory function on 
amygdala activity) might be involved in superego functions. However, this hypothesis is 
made without a basis in empirical evidence. Future research should therefore aim to explore 
the neural basis of superego functions, and particularly the possible role of the basolateral 
amygdala in such functions. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence provided by this study should prove useful to all dream theorists who have 
speculated on the role of the amygdala in dreaming. Although the results provide support for 
the common idea that the amygdala is involved in the generation of negative dream affect, 
certain theories may also need to be moderated given that the basolateral amygdala is clearly 
not essential to the formation of dreams. In particular, this study provides strong evidence 
against some of the claims of Revonsuo’s (2000) TST of dreaming. 
This study found that the dream reports of patients with bilateral basolateral amygdala 
damage were significantly shorter, simpler, more positive, less negative, more wish fulfilling, 
and less likely to be nightmares than the dream reports of control participants. Consequently, 
the dream reports of these patients are strikingly similar to the dream reports of young 
children. 
Contrary to many theoretical predictions, levels of threat and FEAR were not reduced 
in the UWD patients’ dream reports. A possible interpretation of the results is that, although 
dangerous situations do occur in the dreams of patients with bilateral basolateral amygdala 
lesions, the patients’ emotional reaction to these situations tend to be less intense than that of 
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controls, and these situations are more frequently resolved in the patients’ dream reports than 
they are in control dream reports. 
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APPENDIX A  
MRI Scans Showing Basolateral Amygdala Damage in UWD Patients 
 
 
Figure 4. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 1. 
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Figure 5. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 2. 
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Figure 6. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 3. 
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Figure 7. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 4. 
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Figure 8. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 5. 
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Figure 9. MRI scan for UWD patient no. 6. 
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Figure 10. MRI scans for UWD patient no. 7. 
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Figure 11. MRI scans for UWD patient no. 8. 
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APPENDIX B  
The MRD Report Questionnaire 
 
We would like you to describe the last dream you remember having, whether it was 
last night, last month, or last year.  
 
Please describe the dream exactly and as fully as you remember it. Your report should 
contain, whenever possible: a description of the setting of the dream, whether it was familiar 
to you or not; a description of the people, their age, sex, and relationship to you; and any 
animals that appeared in the dream. If possible describe your feelings during the dream and 
whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. Be sure to describe exactly what happened to you and 
the other characters in the dream. Continue your report on the other side and on additional 
sheets if necessary. 
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APPENDIX C 
Instructions for Research Assistants 
General Overview 
The work I’m going to ask you to do will involve coding a series of dreams along different 
measures.  
For each coding measure, I’ll first train you in the coding methods and have you code 
practice dreams. 
Most of the measures you will be coding individually. So once we’ve finished practicing, 
you’ll code 10 dreams on your own and I’ll calculate inter-rater reliability based on your 
coding for these dreams; we’ll aim to achieve 80% consensus on the practice dreams before 
you can start with the actual data analysis. Then you can complete this coding in your own 
time at home.  
For the eight emotional categories, and for the bizarreness scale, you’ll need to code by 
consensus. This entails that you will discuss the rating of each dream on each of these 
measures amongst yourselves until you all agree, and then you’ll record the result. I won’t be 
involved in this coding at all; although I will be in the room with you should any problems 
arise. 
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AFFECT 
1) Here, you are required to decide, by consensus to what extent each of the following 
categories of emotion is present in the dream that you are coding. Please rate all seven 
categories of emotion for each dream.  
A Anger/Rage: 
 
 
 
Aggression: 
Anger refers to feelings of strong displeasure or hostility; 
annoyance; irritation; fury; resentment. Rage refers to 
feelings of violent explosive anger. 
 
Hostility; violence; feelings of aggression. 
B Sexual Love/Erotism: Sexual love refers to the fulfilment of sexual gratification of 
any kind. The desire for sexual gratification, or the 
anticipation  of any sexual interactions, should be rated under 
category D. 
C Playfulness: 
 
 
 
Joy: 
 
Exuberance: 
Finding or making causes for amusement; pleasantly 
humorous or jesting; full of fun and high spirits. Any actions 
relating to play should be rated here as well. 
 
Happiness; pleasure; enjoyment; bliss; delight. 
 
Enthusiasm; excitement; liveliness; energy; high spirits; 
cheerfulness 
D Seeking/Curiosity: 
 
 
 
Anticipation: 
To try to locate or discover; the act of searching for 
something; to try to obtain. Curiosity refers to feelings of 
inquisitiveness or interest. 
 
To look forward to, especially with pleasure; expectance; 
suspense; hopefulness.  
E Care/Nurturance: 
 
 
Affection: 
To watch over; be responsible for; physical and emotional 
care and nourishment; to nurture someone or something. 
 
A feeling of warm personal attachment or deep affection, as 
for a parent, child, spouse or friend. Feelings of love should 
be included here only if of a non-sexual type – if feelings of 
love are both sexual and affectionate, then both categories (B 
and E) should be chosen. 
F Fear: 
 
 
 
Anxiety: 
 
 
Apprehension: 
A distressing emotion aroused by impending danger, evil, 
pain, etc., whether the threat is real or imagined; the feeling 
or condition of being afraid; dismay, dread, terror, fright, 
panic. 
 
Distress or uneasiness of mind caused by fear of danger or 
misfortune. 
 
Uneasiness; worry; nervousness; hesitation. 
G Sorrow/Grief/Loss: Mental suffering or pain caused by separation, loss or 
despair; a feeling of being upset; a source of deep mental 
anguish, torment, distress. 
 
92 
Please use the following 0-3 scale: 
3=these emotions were very intense 
2= a moderate amount of these emotions were present 
1=very little of these emotions were present 
0= these emotions were absent 
 
1. On the same 0-3 scale (but working individually) – please rate: 
A – The general intensity of the positive affect (i.e. pleasant emotion) shown in the dream as 
a whole. 
B – The general intensity of the negative affect (i.e. unpleasant emotion) shown in the dream 
as a whole. 
 
2. Individually, using another 0-3 scale, please rate the extent to which you think this 
dream contains the fulfilment of a wish.  
A wish fulfilling dream is defined as any dream in which something that the dreamer seeks, 
wants, or would enjoy (or that we can reasonably assume that the dreamer seeks, wants or 
would enjoy) does in fact take place. The wish can be something very simple or mundane, 
like eating ice-cream or even drinking water, or complex like achieving an abstract goal. 
 
Please use the following 0-3 scale: 
3=this dream is completely wish-fulfilling 
2=this dream includes a clear wish-fulfilment but also includes other aspects 
1=this dream has some elements of wish fulfilment but is predominantly not a wish 
fulfilling dream. 
0=this dream includes no wish-fulfilling elements. 
 
Examples: 
3: “I dreamt that my deceased pet dog was alive again, and I hugged him.” 
2: “I was running towards a cliff and felt scared but then realised I was able to fly, so I dived 
off the cliff and enjoyed flying over a beautiful landscape.” 
1: “I was lost in a scary part of town when a stranger came up to me and offered help. I was 
very relieved, but then suddenly I was on my own and scared again. Then I woke up.” 
0: “I dreamt I was being chased by a person I remember from childhood, who I was always 
scared of”.  
 
3. Would you call this dream a nightmare? Please answer yes or no individually. Please 
make this decision based on a common-sense understanding of what a nightmare is, 
namely: 
“Dreams marked by intensified feelings of dread or terror or other highly disturbing or 
unpleasant emotions, often with vivid visual imagery. These feelings are so intense that they 
typically cause the individual to wake up.” 
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Threat 
Please choose either yes or no in response to each question, except for question 3, where you 
are required to choose between ancestral or modern. Note:  If the answer to question 1 is no, 
do not continue with the other questions. If the answer to question 4 is no, do not answer 
question 5. 
1) Does the dream contain a realistic physical threat to the dreamer?  
If yes:  
2) Is the threat life threatening? 
3) Is the threat ancestral or modern? 
Ancestral: ecologically valid threats - those present in our ancestral past, or similar to 
those present in our ancestral past, e.g. violent crime (murder, rape, assault, robbery) 
– include being threatened with a gun or shot at. 
Modern: Significant physical threats which have no equivalent in our ancestral past, 
e.g. major surgery, traffic accidents, airplane disasters, hijacking. 
4) Does the dreamer escape the threat? 
If yes: 
5) Is the escape realistic? 
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Avoidance and Approach Behaviour 
1)  Decide whether the main activity in the dream as a whole involves ‘avoidance’ or 
‘approach’ behaviour on the dreamer’s part. The behaviour must be rated either 
‘avoidance’ or ‘approach’; there is no other alternative. If more than one event is 
described, code the sequence of events as a whole. ‘Avoidance’ behaviour is defined 
as: ‘the main activity of the subject of the dream is an attempt to avoid something 
through fleeing, freezing, hiding or the like’. ‘Approach’ behaviour is defined as: ‘the 
main action of the subject of the dream is an attempt to approach something through 
engagement, exploration, curiosity or the like’. Code the dream in accordance with the 
dreamer’s actual behaviour rather than their feelings, even if these contradict each 
other. For example, if the dreamer approaches an unknown place despite feeling 
scared, that is an instance of ‘approach’ behaviour. Likewise, if the dreamer is curious 
about an unknown person but hides away from him/her, that is ‘avoidance’ behaviour.  
 
The following are prototypical examples of ‘avoidance’ and ‘approach’ behaviours, based on 
the scientific literature. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive; they just describe 
good examples of the two types. 
Typical examples of ‘approach’ behaviour: 
1. The dreamer engages with a thing/place/person/problem in an invigorated exploratory 
fashion, investigating or puzzling over it or trying to make sense of it. 
2. The dreamer acts in a persistently or intensely interested/curious/inquisitive fashion. 
3. The dreamer is eagerly seeking new sensations or exciting experiences. 
4. The dreamer is searching for something or pursuing a goal, even if s/he does not or cannot 
achieve it. 
5. The dreamer acts as though s/he is looking forward to something and/or anticipating 
something. 
6. Almost any little thing stimulates the dreamer’s interest. 
Typical examples of ‘avoidance’ behaviour: 
1. The dreamer is acting in an apprehensive, tense, worried or generally nervous fashion. 
2. The dreamer is attempting to escape and avoid something unpleasant. 
3. The dreamer is frozen or rooted to the spot by something frightening. 
4. The dreamer is stuck and cannot reach a decision about something. 
5. The dreamer misses an opportunity due to worry or anxiety. 
6. The dreamer acts as though s/he dreads something bad. 
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WORD COUNT 
The first counted word will be the first word that describes the dream, and the count will end 
with the last word. Do not count the answers to questions following the initial 
report.  Introductory words such as “I dreamt that” and words that indicate clearly waking 
activity such as “…when I woke up I thought about the dream/story” will be excluded from 
the story or dream word count. Repetition and words implying hesitation will be excluded 
from the count. Example:  
Child: I, er, dreamt that dogs, um, that dogs came into my room. Then I woke up. 
      1              2   3  4  5 
Repetition that includes new information will be included. Affirmative or negative single 
words or phrase answers such as “yes”, “yes, I do”, “no”, “no, I don’t”, “I can’t 
remember”, will not be counted. Example: 
Child: Yes, I remember, that, er, I dreamt that dogs, uhm, that big dogs came into my room. 
                        1           2  3   4   5  6  7  
NARRATIVE ITEM COUNT 
The narrative item count will represent the number of meaningful chunks of information 
contained in the dream report. The same basic guidelines as per word count will be used. 
However, the entire dream report should be considered.  Every event, action, dialogue, 
thought, feeling, etc. that forms  a part of the dream will be counted. Introductory words such 
as “I dreamt that / I remember that” and words that clearly indicate waking activity such as 
“…when I woke up I thought about the dream/story” will be excluded from the count, as will 
any reference to waking life that does not form part of the actual dream report. Exclude the 
word “and”, repetition, and words implying hesitation. Repetition of the same narrative item 
will be ignored even if it is expressed in different wording. However, if the repetition 
includes new information, then that new information will be counted.  
Example: 
Child: In my dream there was a boy named Max and he was sent to his room without supper. 
	 	 	 	   1        2      3      4       5      6     7	
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BIZARRENESS 
 
1) Here, please first identify each content element and assign it to a content category. 
Once you have done this, please indicate on the form how many instance of each 
content category you observed. 
 
2)  Now, please identify each content element as either: non-bizarre, incongruous 
(distorted, exotic, or impossible), vague, or discontinuous. Please indicate on the 
form how many of each bizarreness-type you observed under each content 
category. 
The Content Analysis of Bizarreness Scale.1 
Scoring is carried out in two stages: (1) Element identification and (2) Content/bizarreness 
scoring (see text for details). The use of this scale requires that there is adequate background 
information concerning how the dream events relate to the personal waking reality of the 
dreamer. 
 
Identification of Content Elements 
General principles 
 
(1)  Every identified element is assigned to one and only one 
content category.  
 
(2)  Every dream element carrying novel information is identified 
when it is mentioned for the first time in the dream report. For 
example, an object and all the adjectives used to describe its 
features are each identified as distinct elements. 
 
(3)  If new features of a previously mentioned element are 
mentioned, they are scored as new elements. Redundant 
information is not to be scored. 
 
(4)  An element is identified only when it is explicitly mentioned in 
the dream report. No elements are to be inferred on the basis of 
context. 
 
(5)  Elements are identified only in such parts of the dream report 
which are described as real events from the point of view of the 
dreamer. If dreamed events or objects are represented as unreal 
                                                 
 
     1The original scale used in this study as well as the dreams analyzed were in 
Finnish. Some of the translations presented here may be only approximate. 
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in the dream (e.g. events or objects in a movie watched in the 
dream) they are not to be scored. 
 
There are 14 content element categories. Of these, seven refer to different kinds of object-like 
entities which are directly perceived in the dream (Self, Place, Persons, Animals, Body Parts, 
Plants, Objects). In the dream report, these elements consist of (1) nouns referring to these 
entities (e.g., dog, man, home, tree, table) or (2) adjectives or other words describing the 
perceptible features of these entities (e.g., big, small, old, green, angry, broken). The rest of 
the content categories refer to different kinds of entities and their identification is explained 
below in detail. 
 
Classification of bizarreness 
 
(1) Every bizarre feature is scored as bizarre only when it is mentioned for the first time in 
the dream. The bizarre element sets the context for what can be considered as a further 
bizarreness. Thus, the direct implications of a bizarre assumption in the dream are not 
themselves considered as independently bizarre. Only elements which bring further bizarre 
assumptions to the dream are scored as independently bizarre (cf. Hunt, 1982, p.594). Thus, 
dreaming of seeing a kangaroo in the bushes on my backyard is scored as a bizarre animal 
(animal in a wrong context). But if I dream that I am in Australia and in this dream there is a 
kangaroo in the bushes, it is not an exotic animal in this context, but Australia is scored as a 
bizarre place (the place is an unlikely context for me). And if I next see cloudberries growing 
in a forest in Australia, this is of course a bizarre plant (plant in a wrong context). 
 
(2) Every element is non-bizarre until shown to be bizarre. That is, if the judges disagree as to 
whether a certain element is bizarre or not, the burden of proof is on the one claiming that the 
element is bizarre. 
 
There are 3 mutually exclusive bizarreness categories and 1 non-exclusive category. The 
general features of the  
 
Bizarreness Categories: 
 
1. Non-bizarre element. A dream element (or its feature) which is ordinary and congruous 
with waking reality.  
Example: I dream that I am in my room which appears as it is in waking reality [non-bizarre 
place]. 
 
2. Incongruous element. A dream element which has at least one of the following properties: 
 
2a. Internally distorted or contextually incongruous elements. An element 
which has a feature that does not belong to it in waking reality or which 
appears in a context in which it would not appear in waking reality. 
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Example: My room is much bigger than it is in reality [internally distorted 
place]. My room is in the middle of a forest [contextually incongruous place]. 
 
2b. Exotic elements. An element which is highly unlikely to occur in the 
dreamer's waking reality, but the occurrence of which is nevertheless possible 
in principle. 
Example: I was in a tropical jungle [exotic place].  
I met the Secretary General of the United Nations [exotic character]. 
2c. Impossible elements. An element or a feature of an element the existence 
or occurrence of which is not possible in waking reality. 
My dead grandfather came to visit us [impossible character]. I was flying 
above the city like Superman [impossible action]. We were on an alien planet 
[impossible place]. 
 
3. Vague element. An element or a feature of an element the character or identity of which is 
indeterminate, unknown or obscure in a way which does not occur in waking life. 
 
Example: I was in a place which was my room but at the same time it was also a submarine 
[indeterminate identity of place]. 
I was in some city but I do not know or remember which one [vague identity of place]. 
 
Bizarreness categories 1-3 are mutually exclusive and each content element falls into one and 
only one of these categories. There was a further bizarreness category in addition to these 
which could be assigned to a content element.  
 
4. Discontinuous element. An element which is temporally discontinuous; it suddenly and 
unexpectedly appears or disappears or is transformed in the dream. The content of a 
discontinuous element is always the one to which the element belongs after the 
transformation. In case the discontinuity is total (i.e. everything else but the Self changes) but 
the discontinuity is not in any way noticed or commented (e.g. "and suddenly I was..."), it is 
considered and scored as a whole new dream, not a discontinuity within one dream. 
 
This category was not mutually exclusive with the others, since an element can be 
discontinuous independently of whether it is non-bizarre, incongruous, or vague.  
 
 
DEFINITIONS OF CONTENT CATEGORIES AND BIZARRE CONTENT 
ELEMENTS 
1. Self 
 
Definition: The subject (or its features) who acts in or observes the dream world. The person 
or being from whose point of view the dream world is experienced and who appears in the 
first person in the dream report. The features scored as features of Self are those which 
belong to the identity of the Self (age, sex, size, race, profession). 
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1.1. Non-Bizarre Self 
The self in the dream is not mentioned being in any way different from the 
corresponding person in the real world. The self of the dream is essentially the 
same person with features similar to the dreamer's self when awake. 
 
1.2. Incongruous Self  
a) [Distorted] The self in the dream has a feature which does not belong to the 
person in real life. The dream self is the waking self, but somehow distorted 
(e.g. different age, sex, profession, social status etc.). 
 
b) [Exotic] The self in the dream is not the same person as in real life. The 
dream self is identified as a different person, not only as a distortion of the 
waking person. 
 
c) [Impossible] The self in the dream is not a real human being at all. It is an 
animal, a robot, a supernatural being, or some other fictional or unreal 
character. 
 
1.3. Vague Self 
There is no determinate self in the dream, or it is very obscure or 
indeterminate and difficult to describe. 
 
1.4. Discontinuous Self 
The self in the dream suddenly and unexpectedly appears, transforms or 
disappears. 
 
2. Place 
 
Definition: The immediate surroundings (and its features) and geographical location of the 
dream events or the dream self. For example: room, building, street, forest, train, city, 
country. Implies that the dream events are represented from a point of view within the place. 
If e.g. a building is observed only from the outside, it falls under the category of Object. 
Features of Place include, for example, temperature and other weather conditions (darkness, 
lightness), and all "global" features which are not features of a single Object or other element 
in the Place. 
 
2.1. Non-Bizarre Place 
The place in the dream is either a familiar place similar to the one in the real 
world or an unfamiliar but ordinary place. 
 
2.2. Incongruous Place  
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a) [Distorted] A familiar place which in the dream has a feature which does 
not belong to it in real life. Also a familiar place in a wrong geographical or 
temporal context. 
 
b) [Exotic] A place which is very unfamiliar and a very unlikely one for the 
subject to find himself in in real life. 
 
c) [Impossible] A place in which it is not physically possible for the subject to 
be (e.g. outer space, a fictional place). 
 
2.3. Vague Place 
A place the nature or identity of which is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
2.4. Discontinuous Place 
A sudden and unexpected appearance, transformation, or disappearance of the 
place. 
 
3. Time 
 
Definition: The explicitly mentioned temporal context of the dream events. Time of the day, 
date, month, season, year, era. 
 
 
3.1. Non-bizarre time 
The time mentioned in the dream is normal and well in accordance with the 
dream events (e.g. going to work at 8 o'clock in the morning). 
3.2. Incongruous time 
 
a) [Distortion] The time mentioned in the dream is not congruous with the 
dream events (e.g. it is night but the sun is shining). 
 
b)[Exotic time] The time mentioned in the dream clearly deviates from the 
present real time and is far from the present reality of the dreamer, but belongs 
to his or her possible past or future. 
 
c)[Impossible time] The time mentioned in the dream cannot belong to the 
possible personal past or future of the dreamer. The dream events take place in 
the distant past or future. 
 
3.3. Vague time 
The time of the dream events is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
3.4. Discontinuous time 
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A sudden and unexpected change of or break in the temporal context of the 
dream. 
 
4. Persons 
 
Definition: The human or humanoid or other intelligent characters, and groups formed by 
such characters, perceived by the subject in the dream. Features to be scored as features of 
persons include age, sex, size, race, profession. 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre person 
 
A familiar person who is not mentioned differing from the corresponding real 
person or an unfamiliar but ordinary person. 
 
4.2. Incongruous person 
 
a)[Distorted person] A person with a feature that does not belong to that 
person in reality (e.g. different appearance or age) or a person in a wrong 
context (e.g. in a different role or place). 
 
b) [Exotic person] A person that is very unlikely to be met by the dreamer in 
real life. 
 
c) [Impossible person] A person that does not or cannot exist (e.g. a dead or a 
fictional character)  
 
4.3. Vague person 
A person whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous person 
A person who suddenly and unexpectedly appears, transforms, or disappears. 
 
5. Animals 
 
Definition: Animate characters other than Persons perceived in the dream, and groups formed 
by such characters. Includes non-humanlike unknown monsters and alien creatures. 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre animal 
 
A familiar or ordinary (species of) animal. 
 
4.2. Incongruous animal 
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a)[Distorted animal] An animal with a feature that does not belong to it in 
reality (e.g. different appearance) or an animal appearing in a wrong context. 
 
b) [Exotic animal] An animal that is very unlikely to be met by the dreamer in 
real life. 
 
c) [Impossible animal] An animal which does not or cannot exist. 
 
4.3. Vague animal 
An animal whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous animal 
An animal which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
 
6. Body Parts 
 
Definition: Human and animal bodies and their parts and features perceived in the dream. 
The parts can belong to a character (the beak of a bird) or they may be detached (a bearskin, a 
tooth). Also the fluids of the body (blood, slime, etc.) and perceivable injuries of the body 
(bruises, tumors, bumps, rash, pimples, etc.).  
 
4.1. Non-bizarre body part 
An ordinary body part which is does not differ from the corresponding real 
one. 
 
4.2. Incongruous body part 
 
a)[Distorted body part] A body part with a feature that does not belong to it in 
reality (e.g. different appearance) or a body part in a wrong context (e.g. an 
additional or missing body part). 
 
b) [Exotic body part] A body part that is very unlikely to be met by the 
dreamer in real life (the trunk of an elephant, synthetic body parts). 
 
c) [Impossible body part] A body part which does not or cannot exist (e.g. 
detached but living and moving body parts) 
 
4.3. Vague body part 
A body part whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous body part 
A body part which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
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7. Plants  
 
Definition: All kinds of vegetation (trees, flowers, bushes, mushrooms, grass) and their parts 
(berries, fruits, vegetables, roots, branches, leaves) perceived in the dream. 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre plant 
 
A familiar plant which is not mentioned differing from the corresponding real 
plant or an unfamiliar but ordinary one. 
 
4.2. Incongruous plant 
 
a)[Distorted plant] A plant with a feature that does not belong to it in reality 
(e.g. different appearance) or a plant in a wrong context. 
 
b) [Exotic plant] A plant that the dreamer is very unlikely to come across in 
real life. 
 
c) [Impossible plant] A plant which does not or cannot exist (e.g. moving 
plants) 
 
4.3. Vague plant 
A plant whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous plant 
A plant which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
 
8. Objects 
 
Definition: A part (or a feature of a part) of the inanimate environment, which is perceived in 
the dream. Different objects can be perceived in different ways (vision, touch, hearing). 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre object 
 
A familiar object which is not mentioned differing from the corresponding real 
object or an unfamiliar but ordinary one. 
 
4.2. Incongruous object 
 
a)[Distorted object] An object with a feature that does not belong to that object 
in reality (e.g. different appearance), or an object in a wrong context (e.g. in an 
inappropriate place). 
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b) [Exotic object] An object that the dreamer is very unlikely to come across 
in real life. 
 
c) [Impossible object] An object which does not or cannot exist. 
 
4.3. Vague object 
An object whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous object 
An object which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
 
9. Events 
 
Definition: Events are causal changes taking place in the inanimate environment or in 
animate objects, which cannot be considered as the intentional actions of any single character 
(e.g. weather processes, the behaviour of objects when not guided by dream characters, 
collective events like wars, riots, gatherings). Incidents which happen to the dream characters 
without their control (bumping into something, finding something etc.). 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre event 
 
A familiar event or incident which is not mentioned differing from the 
corresponding real event or an unfamiliar but ordinary one. 
 
4.2. Incongruous event 
 
a)[Distorted event] An event with a feature that does not belong to that event 
in reality (e.g. the event does not have its regular causal consequences), or an 
event in a wrong context (e.g. in a different role or place). 
 
b) [Exotic event] An event that is very unlikely to take place in real life (e.g. 
the eruption of a volcano in England). 
 
c) [Impossible event] An event which does not or cannot take place (e.g. 
objects flying by themselves, broken objects mending by themselves)  
 
4.3. Vague event 
An event whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous event 
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An event which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears (e.g. a sudden event taking place without any preceding causal 
antecedent). 
 
10. Action 
 
Definition: Actions are intentional acts carried out by the animate characters in the dream. 
Also the behaviour of devices directly controlled or assumed to be controlled by animate 
characters (cars, airplanes). Also actions of speaking when no referral to the content of 
speech is made (content belongs to Language). If action is only planned but not carried out by 
the Self, it belongs to Cognition. 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre action 
 
A familiar action which is not mentioned differing from the corresponding real 
action or an unfamiliar but ordinary action. 
 
4.2. Incongruous action 
 
a)[Distorted action] An action with a feature that does not belong to that action 
in reality (e.g. abnormal or repeated failure in a trivial action) or an action in a 
wrong context (e.g. in an inappropriate role or place). 
 
b) [Exotic action] An action that is very unlikely to be carried out in real life 
(e.g. very risky or perverted or criminal action). 
 
c) [Impossible action] An action which is not physically possible (e.g. flying 
by flapping one's arms, breathing under water without diving equipment)  
 
4.3. Vague action 
An action whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous action 
An action which suddenly and unexpectedly (unmotivatedly) is carried out, 
transformed, or suspended and forgotten. 
 
11. Language 
 
Definition: Words and sentences uttered by the animate characters in the dream and other 
linguistic messages and symbols: writing, text, numerical symbols. The message is evaluated 
by its form and its content. 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre language 
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An ordinary expression which has a grammatically correct form and a content 
semantically and pragmatically appropriate. 
 
4.2. Incongruous language 
 
a)[Distorted language] An expression with a feature that does not belong to 
normal colloquial language (e.g. grammatical errors, semantical errors, 
neologisms), or a grammatically correct expression in a wrong context (e.g. 
use of foreign language, a message uttered by an inappropriate speaker, or 
expressing a statement which does not correspond with reality). 
 
b) [Exotic language] An expression that is very unlikely to be uttered in real 
life (e.g. expresses an extremely absurd thought or illogical reasoning) 
 
c) [Impossible language] An expression which is completely irrelevant, 
irrational and absurd and does not make any sense at all. 
 
4.3. Vague language 
An expression whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or 
indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous language 
An expression which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
 
12. Cognition  
 
Definition: The internal intellectual and mental functions of the Self. For example: internal 
speech, thoughts, beliefs, value judgements, reflection on events, planning, problem solving, 
decision making, reasoning, mental imagery, knowing and understanding. The mental 
functions of other characters in the dream are not scored in this category but according to 
how they are perceived by the subject (as speech, action, emotion etc.). 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre cognition 
 
A familiar or logical or otherwise adequate thought or cognitive process. 
 
4.2. Incongruous cognition 
 
a)[Distorted cognition] A thought or cognitive process with a feature that does 
not belong to it (e.g. grammatical or semantic errors in internal speech, false 
memories, false understanding, uncritical acceptance of dubious beliefs, 
delusional beliefs not based on anything actually perceived in the dream, false 
or unfounded knowledge). 
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b) [Exotic cognition] Disoriented, irrational and illogical cognitive 
functioning. 
 
c) [Impossible cognition] Loss of control of cognitive processes, continuous 
obsessive thoughts or mental images, irrelevant and disorganized thoughts, 
inability to think at all, termination of all voluntary cognitive processes. 
 
4.3. Vague cognition 
Cognitive processes whose presence or nature or is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous cognition 
Cognitive processes which suddenly and unexpectedly appear, are 
transformed, or disappear. 
 
13. Emotions 
 
Definition: Emotional states and feelings experienced and expressed by the dreamer or 
expressed by other dream characters. Includes emotions, feelings, moods, emotional attitudes 
(desires), and actions which refer to expression of emotions (crying, laughing). 
 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre emotion 
 
An emotion which is adequate in the context in question and would not be 
unlikely to appear in a corresponding waking situation. 
 
 
4.2. Incongruous emotion 
 
a)[Distorted emotion] An ordinary emotion with a feature that does not belong 
to it (exaggerated emotional reaction) or an emotion or lack of it which is 
unlikely in a comparable waking situation. 
 
b) [Exotic emotion] A very extreme emotional reaction rarely encountered in 
waking life but which is somehow related to the dream events. 
 
c) [Impossible emotion] A very extreme emotional reaction which is not in 
any way related to the dream events. 
 
4.3. Vague emotion 
An emotion whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous emotion 
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An emotion which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
 
14. Sensations 
 
Definition: Sense experiences which occur independently of voluntary cognitive processes 
and which do not refer to objects outside of themselves (e.g. pains, itches, sensations of heat, 
pleasure, odor, nausea, sleepiness etc.). 
 
4.1. Non-bizarre sensation 
 
A familiar or ordinary sensation which appears in an appropriate context. 
 
4.2. Incongruous sensation 
 
a)[Distorted sensation] An ordinary sensation with a feature that does not 
normally belong to it (e.g. synesthesia, sensations of abnormal intensity, a 
sensation in an inappropriate context, or lack of normal sensation). 
 
b) [Exotic sensation] A very unlikely sensory experience which is somehow 
related to the dream (e.g. blindness, deafness, disorganization of senses). 
 
c) [Impossible sensation] Sensory experiences not physically possible 
(supernatural senses, indescribable or alien sensory experiences). 
 
4.3. Vague sensation 
A sensation whose presence or nature or identity is obscure or indeterminate. 
 
4.4. Discontinuous sensation 
A sensation which suddenly and unexpectedly appears, is transformed, or 
disappears. 
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APPENDIX E 
Patient Information Sheet 
You are invited to participate in a study on the effects of Lipoid Proteinosis (LP) on 
emotion and dreaming. Specifically, we are trying to document whether LP influences the 
emotional life or dreams of those affected by it. 
If you consent to participate in this study, you will be required to answer the following 
questions (show questionnaires). The interviewer will be Sr. Mara Brandt and the interview will 
take place in private. Your responses will be recorded on a digital recorder (show recorder and 
memory card). Each participant will have their own memory card which will bear a number. No 
name or other personal information will be written on it. All the memory cards will be translated 
(your voice to English text) by one person who does not know you and who will only see the 
number on the card. This person will never know who you are.  
The translation bearing the number will be analysed by another researcher who will also 
never know who you are or whether you have LP or not because your voice will not carry over 
from recording to text. Only once all the transcripts have been analysed will this researcher be 
told which transcript numbers are LP and which are not, as well as the age and sex of each 
transcript, but no names or other personal information will be given. 
There are no anticipated personal risks involved in this research, apart from the 
temporary feelings associated with remembering distressing events. The data gathered from this 
research may be published, but your contribution and data will remain entirely anonymous. 
Prior to the end of the interview there will be a debriefing session during which Sr 
Brandt will ask whether there is anything arising from this interview that you feel needs further 
attention (e.g. if the interview has triggered any strong emotions that you feel you need help 
coping with and you would like to talk to someone about). If so, Sr Brandt will discuss this with 
you in more detail and report back to Dr Morgan who will take the necessary action such as 
arranging for you to see a local psychologist or social worker. If you become aware of any 
problems once Sr Brandt has left you can contact her or Dr Morgan at any time (contact details 
below). You are free to withdraw from the study at any point, without having to provide a 
reason. NB: Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way impact on your 
ongoing medical care and treatment. 
Should you have any questions or queries about the research or your participation, please 
do not hesitate to contact the investigators: 
Dr Barak Morgan: 021 406 6840 (work); 083 417 6264 (cell) 
Sr Mara Brandt: 027 682 2594 (home); 071 076 3999 (cell) 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
I have read and understood this page and been given the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
Signed: _________________________________ on _____________20____ 
 
 
Witness: ________________________________  
 
 
 
 
